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THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP:  
A LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS 
SANGEETHA P ILLAI *  
e Preamble to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) makes three broad claims 
about Australian statutory citizenship: that it signies ‘full and formal membership of the 
Australian community’; that it is characterised by the possession of ‘reciprocal rights and 
obligations’; and that it is a ‘bond’ that ‘unites all Australians’. is article examines the 
extent to which these claims accurately describe the legal implications of citizenship in 
Australia. In doing so, it looks in detail at the degree to which holding Australian 
statutory citizenship impacts upon the rights a person possesses in four broad categories 
that are intrinsically connected with citizenship: status protection rights, rights to entry 
and abode, rights to protection, and political rights. 
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I   INTRODUCTION  
  e Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship represents full and formal 
membership of the community of the Commonwealth of Australia, and Aus-
tralian citizenship is a bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting 
all Australians while respecting their diversity. 
  e Parliament recognises that persons conferred Australian citizenship enjoy 
these rights and undertake to accept these obligations: 
 (a) by pledging loyalty to Australia and its people; and 
 (b) by sharing their democratic beliefs; and 
 (c) by respecting their rights and liberties; and 
 (d) by upholding and obeying the laws of Australia. 
— Preamble, Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) 
Unpacking the legal implications of citizenship in Australia requires an 
inquiry on at least two levels. First, the statutory citizenship regime set up by 
the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (‘ACA 2007 ’) and associated 
legislation must be understood. Secondly, this legislative regime must be 
situated within the parameters of the broader framework established by the 
Australian Constitution. 
e constitutional framework for Australian citizenship has received sig-
niIcant attention in a number of recent scholarly papers.1 Accordingly, this 
 
 1 See, eg, Genevieve Ebbeck, ‘A Constitutional Concept of Australian Citizenship’ (2004) 25 
Adelaide Law Review 137; Kim Rubenstein, ‘e Lottery of Citizenship: e Changing Sig-
niIcance of Birthplace, Territory and Residence to the Australian Membership Prize’ (2004) 
22(2) Law in Context 45; Helen Irving ‘Still Call Australia Home: e Constitution and the 
Citizen’s Right of Abode’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 133; Christopher Tran, ‘New Perspec-
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article directs its focus towards the Irst limb of inquiry: the question of what 
legal consequences Low from the possession of statutory citizenship in 
Australia. is is an issue which has escaped substantial consideration for 
over 10 years, despite the fact that during this time the ACA 2007 was 
introduced to replace the previous citizenship legislation, the Australian 
Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) (‘ACA 1948’). 
In particular, this article seeks to test claims about the legal signiIcance  
of possessing Australian citizenship against the legal reality. e above 
Preamble serves as a useful source of such claims. e Preamble was Irst 
introduced, albeit with slightly diMerent wording, into the Australian Citizen-
ship Act 1948 by amendment in 1993.2 In the second reading speech for the 
amending legislation, Senator John Faulkner stated that the Preamble would 
‘deIn[e] the meaning which the Parliament and the people of Australia accord 
to citizenship’.3  
e Preamble suggests that three broad implications Low from the posses-
sion of statutory citizenship in Australia.4 First, it claims that, unlike non-
citizens, citizens under the Act are ‘full and formal members’ of the Australian 
community. Secondly, it suggests that citizenship is characterised by the 
possession of ‘reciprocal rights and obligations’ that are not held by non-
citizens. Finally, the Preamble describes statutory citizenship as a ‘bond’ that 
‘unite[s] all Australians while respecting their diversity’, suggesting that 
citizenship is underpinned by principles of equality.5  
 
tives on Australian Constitutional Citizenship and Constitutional Identity’ (2012) 33 Ade-
laide Law Review 199; Sangeetha Pillai, ‘Non-Immigrants, Non-Aliens and People of the 
Commonwealth: Australian Constitutional Citizenship Revisited’ (2013) 39 Monash Universi-
ty Law Review 568. 
 2 Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1993 (Cth) s 3. 
 3 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 6 May 1993, 208 (John Faulkner). 
 4 e extent to which the words in a statutory preamble breathe meaning into the statute 
remains a matter of some debate. It is relatively well accepted that preambles do not have the 
direct force of positive law, however they form part of the statutes they precede, and may be 
drawn on as evidence of the object or purpose of these statutes. e circumstances in which 
it is appropriate to have recourse to a preamble are less clear-cut. While some maintain that 
this may only be done to resolve an ambiguity in a statutory provision, others suggest that a 
preamble is more generally relevant as context which sheds light on the objective intention of 
Parliament when draAing the statute: see, eg, Anne Twomey, ‘Constitutional Recognition of 
Indigenous Australians in a Preamble’ (Report No 2, Constitutional Reform Unit, Sydney 
Law School, 2011) 16–21. 
 5 is is underlined by recent publications by the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (formerly the Department of Immigration and Citizenship): see, eg, Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code  
(2011) <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/_pdf/australian-citizenship-ceremonies-code.pdf> 3, 
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In Roach v Electoral Commissioner (‘Roach’),6 Gleeson CJ drew directly on 
the ‘reference to the reciprocity of rights and obligations’ in the Preamble.7 His 
Honour stated that this notion of reciprocity is ‘important in the context of 
membership of the community’, and that breaching the obligations of mem-
bership (for example, through serious criminal activity) may warrant tempo-
rary suspension of legal rights associated with citizenship.8 Gleeson CJ’s 
statement suggests that the citizenship rights and obligations referred to in the 
Preamble are not purely moral or social in nature; to at least some extent, they 
give rise to legal implications. is article analyses the extent of these implica-
tions via an examination of the most signiIcant diMerences between the rights 
of citizens and non-citizens under Commonwealth legislation. is question 
has previously been considered by Kim Rubenstein in her 2002 text, Australi-
an Citizenship Law in Context,9 which comprehensively surveys the extent to 
which Commonwealth legislation discriminates on the basis of statutory 
citizenship. 
Rubenstein’s study reached two broad conclusions: Irst, that statutes far 
more commonly discriminate on the basis of residence in Australia than on 
the basis of citizenship; and secondly, that where citizenship-based discrimi-
nation does exist in Commonwealth legislation, this discrimination lacks any 
‘consistent basis’.10 ough over a decade has elapsed, and the citizenship 
legislation in force in 2002 has been replaced, these conclusions remain 
broadly true today.11 Accordingly, this article adopts a more targeted analysis. 
 
13, 54–5, 57; Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship — Our 
Common Bond (2013) <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/learn/cit_test/test_resource/_pdf/our-
common-bond-2013.pdf> 3, 17. 
 6 (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
 7 Ibid 177 [12]. 
 8 Ibid. It is worth noting that the issue at hand in the case involved the question of the extent to 
which statutory voting rights could be denied to prisoners. us, Gleeson CJ’s remarks were 
nested in this context. His Honour did not directly consider whether Parliament has the 
authority to deny other citizenship rights where ‘civic responsibilities’ are breached, though 
arguably there is some suggestion in the judgment that ‘fundamental political right[s]’ more 
generally might be subject to restriction: ibid 176–7 [12]. 
 9 (Lawbook Co, 2002). 
 10 Ibid 184. 
 11 Certain elements of the statutory regime have shiAed somewhat over time. For example, 
certain statutes which, in 2002, still discriminated on the basis of British subjecthood rather 
than citizenship or residence have now been updated: see, eg, Navigation Act 2012 (Cth). 
Section 128 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) is cited by Rubenstein as an example of a provi-
sion which refers to ‘British subjects’: see Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, 
above n 9, 184, 217. No such references remain in the 2012 Act. Other provisions that applied 
exclusively to citizens have now been expanded so that they also extend to residents: see, eg, 
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Rather than cataloguing every legislative distinction that separates citizens 
and non-citizens, it looks in-depth at the extent to which holding statutory 
citizenship impacts upon the possession of rights in four broad categories: 
status protection rights, rights to entry and abode, rights to protection, and 
political rights. 
ese categories are intrinsically connected with citizenship. Each en-
shrines rights which were fundamental to very early conIgurations of the 
state–citizen relationship.12 Moreover, they have not lost relevance over time; 
internationally, the codiIcation of express citizenship rights in each of the 
four areas is very common, both constitutionally and in statute.13 To a certain 
extent, Australian legislation reLects this trend. In each category, possession of 
Australian citizenship materially aMects the extent to which rights protection 
exists. is is in contrast to most rights in Australia, which are not predicated 
upon possession of citizenship. However, the extent to which citizens’ rights 
protection in these areas is achieved through statutory codiIcation varies 
somewhat. Moreover, legal protection is not always equal for all citizens, 
calling into question the notion of equality between citizens alluded to in the 
Preamble to the ACA 2007. 
is article is divided into Ive parts. Part II contextualises the ACA 2007, 
providing an overview of its substance, and explaining its constitutional basis 
and evolution from historical citizenship legislation in Australia. Part III 
examines the question of what rights Low from the possession of statutory 
Australian citizenship in each of the categories outlined above. In doing so, it 
compares the rights that arise in Australia with those in overseas jurisdictions. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the citizenship rights that exist in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. ese countries emerge as natural 
comparators for Australia for two reasons. First, all four countries share a 
historical connection, in the sense that their concepts of citizenship have roots 
in the common law concept of ‘British subject’ status. Secondly, like Australia 
 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) s 38(3)(d). Nonetheless, Rubenstein’s 
general assessment remains valid. For instance, in the case of statutes with extraterritorial 
application, certain provisions only aMect citizens: see, eg, Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
Conservation Act 1981 (Cth) ss 3 (deInition of ‘Australian national’), 5(2)(a); Chemical 
Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1994 (Cth) s 5(1). However, others operate upon both citizens and 
residents: see eg Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth) s 27(2) (deInition of ‘Australian operator’); 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 5(1). As Rubenstein suggested in 2002, there is 
no clearly apparent reason for why such statutes diMer in application: Rubenstein, Australian 
Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 201. 
 12 See further Part III(A) below, in particular nn 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 13 See further Part III below. 
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but unlike a large number of countries worldwide, legal citizenship in the UK, 
Canada and New Zealand is primarily developed through statute, rather than 
constitutionally.14 Part IV examines the question of which obligations, if any, 
can be said to arise reciprocally to the rights considered in Part III. Part V 
concludes by considering whether the Preamble’s three claims about the 
nature of Australian citizenship are borne out by Australian law, based on the 
analysis in Parts III and IV. 
II   AUSTRALIAN C IT IZENSHIP  LEGISLATION IN  CONTEXT  
A  e Constitutional Basis for Australian Citizenship Legislation 
It has been well noted that the Australian Constitution makes no direct 
reference to a national citizenship.15 e Constitution does not deIne a class of 
people with an entitlement to hold the status of Australian citizenship, 
prescribe the rights that Low from holding such a status, or even confer a clear 
power upon Parliament to deIne citizenship through legislation. 
Notwithstanding this, a statutory concept of Australian citizenship was 
introduced in 1949, with the entry into force of the Nationality and Citizen-
ship Act 1948 (Cth) (‘NCA 1948’) (later renamed in 1973 the ‘Australian 
Citizenship Act 1948’).16 Statutory citizenship has remained an Australian legal 
Ixture ever since, though its parameters have expanded and contracted over 
time. Today, the legislative concept of Australian citizenship is enshrined in 
the ACA 2007. 
e Commonwealth’s constitutional power to deIne the concept of Aus-
tralian citizenship through legislation has been aUrmed on a number of 
occasions by members of the High Court.17 e basis for this power has been 
 
 14 Moreover, citizenship legislation in each of these countries substantially mirrors the form of 
the ACA 2007. e relevant statutes are the British Nationality Act 1981 (UK) c 61; Citizen-
ship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29; and Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ). Like the ACA 2007, each of these 
Acts provides for the acquisition and loss of citizenship, but does not comprehensively codify 
the rights of citizenship. Further, the various ways in which citizenship may be acquired and 
lost are common between all four countries — though the speciIcs vary somewhat. is is 
discussed further in Part III(B) below. 
 15 See, eg, Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home’, above n 1, 133. 
 16 In 1969, s 1(3) of the Citizenship Act 1969 (Cth) amended the name of the Nationality and 
Citizenship Act to the Citizenship Act 1948–1969 (Cth). In 1973, the Act was renamed again 
as the Australian Citizenship Act 1948–1973 (Cth), via s 1(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 
1973 (Cth). It is most commonly referred to as the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth). 
 17 See, eg, Nolan v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic A?airs (1988) 165 CLR 178, 190 
(Gaudron J); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural A?airs; Ex parte Te (2002) 212 CLR 
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contemplated by individual judges, who have suggested a number of potential 
anchors.18 For instance, in Singh v Commonwealth (‘Singh’),19 Gleeson CJ held 
that, pursuant to the naturalisation and aliens power under s 51(xix) and the 
immigration power under s 51(xxvii) of the Australian Constitution,  
Parliament … has the power to determine the legal basis by reference to which 
Australia deals with matters of nationality and immigration, to create and de-
Ine the concept of Australian citizenship, to prescribe the conditions on which 
such citizenship may be acquired and lost, and to link citizenship with the right 
of abode.20 
e Commonwealth’s power to pass citizenship legislation has only been 
challenged once. In Hwang v Commonwealth (‘Hwang’),21 McHugh J, sitting 
alone, dismissed the claim, stating that ‘it is hardly to be supposed that the 
national government of an independent sovereign state such as Australia does 
not have the power to declare to the world who are the citizens of Australia’.22 
However, his Honour did not isolate the precise basis for the Commonwealth’s 
power to regulate citizenship. While emphasising that this power is broad, and 
that a number of factors at least suUce to authorise citizenship legislation in 
its form at the time,23 he expressly recognised that express and implied 
 
162, 173 [31] (Gleeson CJ); Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 329 [4] 
(Gleeson CJ); Hwang v Commonwealth (2005) 222 ALR 83, 86 [9] (McHugh J). Discussion[s] 
of judicial statements to this eMect are included in Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in 
Context, above n 9, 71–4, though a number of relevant judgments were handed down aAer 
the publication of that text. 
 18 For a fuller discussion on this point, see Pillai, above n 1, 590, 593–4, 600,  
 19 (2004) 222 CLR 322. 
 20 Ibid 329 [4]. See also Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural A?airs; Ex parte Te 
(2002) 212 CLR 162, 173 [31] (Gleeson CJ). 
 21 (2005) 222 ALR 83. 
 22 Ibid 86 [9]. 
 23 Ibid. In addition to the naturalisation and aliens and immigration powers, McHugh J 
suggested that, at least since the adoption of the Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo 5, 
c 4 in 1942, Parliament has had the power to determine the citizenry, subject to any express 
or implied constitutional prohibitions. His Honour stated that this power arose from the 
Commonwealth’s ‘status and existence as a national polity’: ibid 86 [9]. A number of previous 
High Court authorities have acknowledged the existence of an ‘implied nationhood power’ 
— which, amongst other things, creates legislative powers that ‘arise from the national status 
of the Commonwealth as a sovereign body and a polity who speaks to the world on behalf of 
Australians’: see, eg, A-G (Vic) ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 269 (Dixon J) 
(‘Pharmaceutical Benets Case’); Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 396–7 (Ma-
son J) (‘AAP Case’); New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 373–4 (Bar-
wick CJ), 389 (Gibbs J), 470 (Mason J), 505 (Murphy J) (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’); 
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constitutional limitations form boundaries within which such legislation must 
be created. McHugh J suggested that such boundaries stem from the constitu-
tional phrase ‘the people of the Commonwealth’, which points to a class  
of people who cannot be excluded from the citizenry.24 In the view expressed  
by Gleeson CJ in Singh, limitations stem instead from the boundaries of  
the constitutional powers that authorise citizenship legislation: ss 51(xxvii)  
and 51(xix).25 
Ultimately, no High Court majority has ever reached agreement on either 
the basis for or the scope of the Commonwealth’s power to enact citizenship 
legislation. It is clear that there must be some limit to Parliament’s power to 
deIne the concept of citizenship through statute. However, until the basis and 
scope of the power are settled, where this limit lies will remain ill-deIned. 
What is relatively well-established, however, is that a clear constitutional basis 
exists for citizenship legislation in its current form.26 
B  e Historical Development of Australian Citizenship Legislation 
e commencement of the NCA 1948 signiIed the emergence of Australian 
statutory citizenship. However, this did not symbolise a radical shiA in 
notions of formal membership of the Australian community, but rather a 
relatively gradual evolution from previous statutes which had shaped such 
notions without using the language of citizenship. 
e legislative regulation of formal membership of the Australian commu-
nity in the early years of Australian federation has been charted in detail by 
other scholars,27 and a comprehensive review of this material is not the object 
of this article. For present purposes, it suUces to note that early statutes, such 
as the Naturalization Act 1903 (Cth) and the Nationality Act 1920 (Cth) 
 
Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 94 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ). Moreo-
ver, McHugh J held that Commonwealth powers to enact citizenship legislation and to deIne 
‘the people’ who comprise the Australian community existed at Federation itself, although as 
a matter of practice the existence of UK legislation made it impossible to exercise these pow-
ers for a number of years: ibid 86–7 [10]. 
 24 Hwang (2005) 222 ALR 83, 89 [18]. 
 25 Singh (2004) 222 CLR 322, 329 [4]. 
 26 While the validity of the ACA 2007 has never been challenged, the Act does not seem to 
diMer in any constitutionally signiIcant way from its previous iteration, the validity of which 
has been aUrmed in Singh, Hwang and a number of other cases. 
 27 See, eg, Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9; Alastair Davidson, 
From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1997). 
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conceived of ‘natural-born British subject status’ as the fullest formal indicator 
of Australian community membership. Both of these statutes created a 
ministerial power to issue naturalisation certiIcates, the grant of which 
conferred upon recipients all the rights and privileges and obligations of a 
natural-born British subject.28 Neither statute, however, speciIed what these 
rights, privileges and obligations were. Moreover, rights and duties were not 
necessarily equal between ‘natural-born British subjects’. John Chesterman 
and Brian Galligan, for instance, point out that while Aboriginal Australians 
were formally regarded as British subjects by birth, they were nonetheless 
excluded from several rights associated with normative membership of the 
Australian community.29 It has been noted that prior to 1948, non-Aboriginal 
people in Australia fell into three broad categories: ‘natural-born British 
subjects’ and ‘naturalised persons’ (who enjoyed substantive community 
membership including permanent residence), ‘British subjects’ (who had 
various substantive rights, including full political rights, but lacked permanent 
residence) and aliens.30  
In addition to its silence on the rights and obligations associated with nat-
uralisation or ‘natural-born British subject’ status, the Naturalization Act 1903 
(Cth) did not deIne what a ‘natural-born British subject’ was, leaving this to 
be determined at common law. In the Nationality Act 1920 (Cth), a deInition 
was included, incorporating elements of both nationality by birth and 
nationality by descent.31 e structure of this deInition was retained in the 
criteria for the possession of Australian citizenship by birth and descent in the 
NCA 1948. e NCA 1948 also retained other features of the Nationality Act 
 
 28 Naturalization Act 1903 (Cth) s 8; Nationality Act 1920 (Cth) s 11. 
 29 John Chesterman and Brian Galligan, Citizens without Rights: Aborigines and Australian 
Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 30 Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 61–2, citing David Dutton, 
‘Citizenship in Australia: A Guide to Commonwealth Government Records’ (Research Guide 
No 10, National Archives of Australia, 1999) 14. Understanding the substantive consequences 
of formal community membership in Australia has always hinged largely upon understand-
ing the consequences of constitutional alienage, which, from the inception of Australian 
federation, was conceived of as the obverse of such membership: see David Dutton, ‘Citizen-
ship in Australia: A Guide to Commonwealth Government Records’ (Research Guide No 10, 
National Archives of Australia, 2000) 59, quoted in Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in 
Context, above n 9, 62. Early High Court cases read the aliens power extremely broadly, 
giving the Commonwealth ‘almost complete control over laws relating to aliens’: Rubenstein, 
Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 58 (citations omitted). Formal community 
membership granted a degree of immunity from such Commonwealth control — though it is 
worth noting that in some cases considerable vulnerability to control under the similarly 
expansive immigration power remained: see, eg, Pillai, above n 1, 580–3. 
 31 Nationality Act 1920 (Cth) s 6(1). 
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1920 (Cth) — for instance, the prescription of residence requirements that 
needed to be fulIlled before a person could be granted a naturalisation 
certiIcate.32  Further, though it created a distinct concept of Australian 
citizenship, the NCA 1948 retained British subject status as the indicator of 
non-alienage, and as a measure of full formal membership of the Australian 
community.33 ose who held Australian citizenship, thus, were both Austral-
ian citizens as well as British subjects.34 Moreover, like the Naturalization Act 
1903 (Cth) and the Nationality Act 1920 (Cth), the NCA 1948 did not spell out 
the ‘rights, powers and privileges’ or ‘obligations, duties and liabilities’ that 
stemmed from full membership of the Australian community, leaving these to 
be determined under other laws. 
e precise statutory requirements for Australian citizenship have shiAed 
over time. e original NCA 1948 conferred citizenship at birth upon any 
person born in Australia, provided their father was not a diplomat or an 
enemy alien.35 In 1986, the relevant provision was changed to limit birthright 
citizenship to persons born in Australia where at least one parent held 
Australian citizenship or permanent residence.36 In 1987, both the term 
‘British subject’ and a deInition of ‘alienage’ in opposition to it, were removed 
from the NCA 1948.37  
However, the basic approach of awarding statutory citizenship on the basis 
of a combination of birth and descent criteria, or via the naturalisation of 
aliens, has been retained to this day. 
C  e Australian Citizenship Act 2007 
In 2007, the ACA 1948 was replaced by the ACA 2007. is legislation 
remains the source of statutory citizenship in Australia today. 
 
 32 Ibid s 7. 
 33 NCA 1948 s 5(1) (deInition of ‘alien’). 
 34 While some British subjects gained Australian citizenship automatically when the Act 
commenced in 1948, such citizenship was not mandatory in order to be a full member of the 
Australian community in either formal or substantive terms. When the legislation was Irst 
introduced, Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell stressed that ‘creation of an Australian 
citizenship under this bill will in no way lessen the advantages and privileges which British 
subjects who may not be Australian citizens enjoy in Australia’: Commonwealth, Parliamen-
tary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 1948, 1062. 
 35 NCA 1948 s 10(2). 
 36 Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) s 4(a). 
 37 ese changes were introduced via ss 4(2)(a) and 33 of the Australian Citizenship Amend-
ment Act 1984 (Cth). ese provisions entered into force on 1 May 1987. 
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e ACA 2007 retains the broad principles that underpinned the ACA 
1948. Like the 1948 Act, it provides for Australian citizenship to be acquired 
‘as of right’ based on a combination of birth and descent criteria,38 and creates 
a ministerial discretion to grant citizenship to others who have satisIed 
particular criteria.39 e Preamble was also retained substantially unchanged. 
Further, the 1993 amendment replaced the ‘Oath of Allegiance’ to Australia 
(that naturalised citizens were previously required to take) with a ‘Pledge of 
Commitment’ to Australia.40 e Pledge is retained in sch 1 of the 2007 Act. 
In the second reading speech for the ACA 2007, then Minister for Citizen-
ship and Multicultural AMairs, John Cobb, emphasised that it was designed to 
‘deliver better structured, clearer, more accessible law, draAed in the language 
of the 21st century’.41 In doing so, the Act sought to give eMect to a recom-
mendation of the 1994 Joint Standing Committee on Migration, that the ACA 
1948 be redraAed using simple language and a modern draAing style.42 
e 2007 Act does, however, introduce a few signiIcant modiIcations to 
Australia’s citizenship framework. e most well-known is its establishment of 
a citizenship test.43 With some exceptions, persons applying for ‘citizenship by 
conferral’44 must have passed the test, in addition to satisfying the general 
eligibility criteria inherited from the ACA 1948.45 Another new feature of the 
 
 38 See ACA 2007 pt 2 div 1. Typically, both birth and descent requirements must be satisIed for 
a person to acquire citizenship automatically: s 12(1). However special provisions operate 
with respect to adopted and abandoned children: ss 13–14. 
 39 ACA 2007 pt 2 div 2. Where a person’s claim to citizenship is based wholly on descent, the 
acquisition of citizenship requires an application to the Minister, though there is no discre-
tion to deny citizenship where eligibility criteria have been met: ss 16–17. e statutory 
regime governing the acquisition of citizenship is discussed in detail below. 
 40 Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1993 (Cth) s 8. 
 41 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 November 2005, 9. 
 42 Joint Standing Committee on Migration, Parliament of Australia, Australians All — 
Enhancing Australian Citizenship (1994). See also Michael Klapdor, Moira Coombs and 
Catherine Bohm, ‘Australian Citizenship: A Chronology of Major Developments in Policy 
and Law’ (Research Paper, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2009) 27–8. 
 43 It is worth noting, however, that the citizenship test provisions did not appear in the original 
version of the ACA 2007, but were introduced via the Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Citizenship Testing) Act 2007 (Cth), which commenced on 1 October 2007. 
 44 See ACA 2007 pt 2 div 2 sub-div B, particularly s 21. 
 45 It is, however, a statutory requirement that the citizenship test be related to the eligibility 
criteria in the ACA 2007 ss 21(2)(d) (‘understands the nature of an application [for citizen-
ship]’), 21(2)(e) (‘possesses a basic knowledge of the English language’) and 21(2)(f) (‘has an 
adequate knowledge of Australia and of the responsibilities and privileges of Australian 
citizenship’): see Note to s 23A(1). Moreover, the eligibility criteria in these subsections are 
taken to be satisIed by successful completion of the citizenship test: s 21(2A). 
2014] e Rights and Responsibilities of Australian Citizenship 747 
ACA 2007 is its express prohibition on the approval of citizenship applications 
made by persons assessed by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(‘ASIO’) as being a direct or indirect risk to Australian society.46 
e ACA 2007 is divided into three Parts. Part 1 contains preliminary 
provisions that canvas the general scope of the Act, as well as a simpliIed 
outline of the whole statute, deInitions of key terms including ‘Australian 
citizen’47 and ‘permanent resident’,48 and clariIcation of the circumstances in 
which historical citizenship legislation requires reference.49  
Part 2 of the Act deals largely with the acquisition and loss of Australian 
citizenship. Division 1 provides for the ‘automatic acquisition of Australian 
citizenship’ in three circumstances: where a person is born in Australia to an 
Australian citizen or permanent resident;50 where a child is adopted by an 
Australian citizen (provided the child was a permanent resident of Australia at 
the time of adoption);51 and where a child is found abandoned in Australia, 
unless and until citizenship of another country is proved.52 Section 15 further 
provides that where Australia acquires a territory, persons ‘connected with 
that territory’ may be made Australian citizens by a ministerial determination 
in a legislative instrument. Notably, as under later iterations of the ACA 1948, 
automatic acquisition of citizenship at birth does not extend to those born in 
Australia where neither parent holds Australian citizenship or permanent 
residency — and High Court authority conIrms that a person born in such 
circumstances is an alien under the Australian Constitution.53 However, where 
such a person remains ‘ordinarily resident’ in Australia until he or she is 10 
years old, citizenship is acquired automatically.54 
Division 2 of pt 2 deals with ‘Australian citizenship by application’. For 
people connected with Australia by descent alone (persons born outside 
 
 46 Ibid ss 17(4), 19D(5), 24(4), 30(4). Limited exceptions apply to stateless persons born in 
Australia or to Australian citizen parents. e Minister is only precluded from approving the 
citizenship applications of such persons where they have been convicted of an oMence in 
speciIed categories: see ss 17(4A)–(4B), 19(6)–(7), 24(4A)–(4B), 30(5)–(6). 
 47 Ibid s 4(1). 
 48 Ibid s 5(1). 
 49 For instance, s 4(2) provides that where it is necessary to determine whether a person was an 
Australian citizen at any time prior to the commencement of the ACA 2007, the ACA 1948 as 
in force at the relevant time should be consulted. 
 50 Ibid s 12. 
 51 Ibid s 13. 
 52 Ibid s 14. 
 53 See Singh (2004) 222 CLR 322; Koroitamana v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 31. 
 54 ACA 2007 s 12(1)(b). 
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Australia where at least one parent held Australian citizenship at the time of 
birth), the acquisition of Australian citizenship is not automatic, and must be 
applied for.55 However, approval of applications lodged on this basis is 
guaranteed,56 except where the applicant’s identity cannot be established,57 or 
where the applicant is subject to an adverse or qualiIed security assessment 
stipulating that he or she poses a security risk.58 Similar criteria govern the 
eligibility for citizenship of persons adopted by Australian citizens outside of 
Australia. However in this circumstance, while an application for citizenship 
must not be approved if the identity of the applicant cannot be conIrmed59 or 
if they are deemed to pose a risk to security,60 there is no general obligation to 
approve applications otherwise. 
Where neither a birth nor descent connection with Australia exists, a per-
son may nonetheless apply for ‘citizenship by conferral’, provided certain 
eligibility criteria have been satisIed. e general criteria, set out in s 21(2) of 
the Act, require applicants to be of ‘good character’; satisfy prescribed 
residency requirements and hold permanent resident status; be likely to 
maintain a residency in or a ‘close and continuing relationship with Australia’; 
understand the nature of their application for citizenship; possess a basic 
knowledge of English; and have an ‘adequate knowledge of Australia and of 
the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship’. In order to satisfy 
the latter three requirements, a person must typically have passed the citizen-
ship test provided for under s 23A.61 However, certain categories of people 
qualify for exemption from the test and relaxed eligibility criteria.62 Unlike 
those who acquire citizenship automatically, or those who make descent-
based applications for citizenship, people who obtain Australian citizenship by 
conferral must typically make the Pledge of Commitment provided for in 
sch 1.63 is involves pledging loyalty to Australia and its people, expressing 
 
 55 Ibid s 16. 
 56 Ibid s 17(2). 
 57 Ibid s 17(3). 
 58 Ibid s 17(4). 
 59 Ibid s 19D(4). Further, pt 2 div 5 of the Act deals in detail with the particulars of identifying 
information. 
 60 Ibid s 19D(5). 
 61 Note to s 23A(1). 
 62 Ibid s 19G. 
 63 See ibid s 26(1) for the circumstances in which a person need not make the Pledge of 
Commitment. 
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commitment to Australia’s democratic beliefs64 and respect for its rights and 
liberties, and promising to ‘uphold and obey’ its laws.65 As with applications 
for descent-based citizenship, fulIlling the criteria for ‘citizenship by confer-
ral’ does not guarantee that citizenship will be granted. However, where the 
criteria are satisIed, the Minister is only expressly precluded from granting 
citizenship to applicants who have been assessed as a national security risk,66 
whose identity cannot be veriIed,67 or who have been convicted of or charged 
with certain oMences.68  
e Inal category of citizenship by application in pt 2 div 2 provides for 
the resumption of citizenship by persons who formerly held Australian 
citizenship. Eligibility criteria must be met,69 but satisfying these criteria does 
not guarantee that a person’s application for resumption will be approved.70 
Further, the Minister is precluded from approving the resumption of a 
person’s citizenship where that person’s identity cannot be established,71 or 
where they have been assessed by ASIO as a direct or indirect risk to Austral-
ia.72 A person who meets the eligibility criteria for citizenship by resumption 
is not precluded from applying for citizenship via any of the other means they 
are eligible for.73 
Division 3 of pt 2 establishes four ways in which Australian citizenship 
may be lost. First, a person may apply to renounce their Australian citizenship 
under s 33. Secondly, s 34 creates a ministerial power to revoke the citizenship 
of people who have obtained citizenship by descent or by conferral, in fairly 
 
 64 e Department of Immigration and Border Protection website states that these democratic 
beliefs are: ‘parliamentary democracy’, ‘the rule of law’, ‘living peacefully’, ‘respect for all 
individuals regardless of background’ and ‘compassion for those in need’: Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Citizenship — Why Should I Become a Citi-
zen? (7 November 2013) <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/should_become/>. 
 65 ACA 2007 sch 1. e content of the Pledge mirrors the description of the undertakings of 
‘persons conferred Australian citizenship’ in the Preamble to the ACA 2007. 
 66 Ibid ss 24(4)–(4D). 
 67 Ibid s 24(3). 
 68 Ibid s 24(6). 
 69 Ibid s 29. 
 70 Ibid s 30(2). 
 71 Ibid s 30(3). 
 72 Ibid s 30(4). Once again, limited exceptions apply to stateless persons born within Australia 
or to Australian citizen parents. Such persons are precluded from resuming citizenship where 
they have been convicted of particular oMences: ss 30(5)–(6). People in this category are not 
excepted from the requirement to refuse resumption of citizenship where identity cannot be 
established: s 30(3). 
 73 Ibid Note 2 to s 29(2). 
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limited circumstances. irdly, s 35 provides that any citizen who also holds 
citizenship of a foreign country automatically loses their Australian citizen-
ship if they serve in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia. 
Finally, s 36 creates a ministerial discretion to revoke the citizenship of a child 
where their responsible parent has lost their Australian citizenship. ese 
categories will be explored in more depth in Part III(B) of this article. 
Part 3 of the Act sets out particulars that apply to the application process, 
and to the way in which the Minister must exercise any decision-making 
powers. NotiIcation of any decisions made must be provided,74 and where an 
adverse decision has been reached, reasons for the decision must be given.75 
Section 52 establishes a right to review in the Administrative Appeals Tribu-
nal with respect to decisions made. 
As discussed above, the Preamble to the Act describes citizenship as ‘a 
common bond, involving reciprocal rights and duties’. However, like the ACA 
1948, the ACA 2007 does not specify what the ‘rights and duties’ of citizenship 
are, leaving this to be determined by other pieces of legislation. Such legisla-
tion far more commonly makes rights contingent upon the lower threshold of 
permanent resident status than on possession of Australian citizenship itself.76 
Moreover, some rights that are reserved exclusively for citizens do not extend 
to all citizens, rendering the ‘rights of citizenship’ uncertain. Similar issues 
arise with respect to determining the duties of citizenship. e Pledge of 
Commitment in sch 1 of the 2007 Act could conceivably serve as a source of 
citizenship obligations. However, as not all citizens are required to take the 
Pledge this raises the question of the extent to which the duties of all citizens 
are equal.77 Parts III and IV below will explore these issues in turn. 
 
 74 Ibid s 47(1).  
 75 Ibid s 47(3). However, a failure to comply with this requirement does not invalidate the 
decision: ibid s 47(5). 
 76 See generally Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, ch 5. 
 77 Notably, a 2008 report by the Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee recommended 
that the citizenship test should assess the requirement of ‘adequate knowledge of … the 
responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship’ in a manner linked to the infor-
mation a person must understand in order to make the Pledge of Commitment: see Australi-
an Citizenship Test Review Committee, ‘Moving Forward … Improving Pathways to Citizen-
ship’ (Report, August 2008) 25 [6.8]. In its response to the Committee’s report, the govern-
ment accepted this recommendation, stating that it ‘strongly supports having the Pledge as 
the centrepiece of Australian citizenship testing’: see Australian Government, ‘Moving For-
ward… Improving Pathways to Citizenship: Government Response to the Report by the 
Australian Citizenship Test Review Committee’ (Report, November 2008) 2. e content of 
the Pledge mirrors the Preamble’s description of the undertakings of ‘persons conferred 
Australian citizenship’: see above n 65. 
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III   R IGHTS THAT FLOW FROM STATUTORY  C IT IZENSHIP  
A  Overview 
In the absence of any clear delineation of the consequences that Low from 
citizenship in the ACA 2007, it is necessary to look to other pieces of  
Commonwealth legislation to determine the nature of citizenship rights  
and obligations. 
Rubenstein’s 2002 work illustrates that a global look at citizenship-based 
discrimination in Commonwealth statutes does not generate a clear list of 
citizenship rights and obligations. Most statutory rights and obligations do 
not hinge upon citizenship status,78 and where statutes do discriminate on the 
basis of citizenship there is no ‘consistent basis’ for this discrimination.79 is 
Part builds upon this work, by examining in detail the extent to which 
statutory citizenship rights can be said to exist in four broad categories that 
are intrinsically connected with citizenship: status protection rights, rights to 
entry and abode, rights to protection, and political rights. 
Rights in each of these categories have been associated with citizenship 
since its earliest days. e idea of citizenship as a value-laden legal status,80 
guaranteed to particular individuals who could not be divested of it,81 has its 
roots in the ancient Roman concept of citizenship, as does the notion of 
citizenship as a source of inclusion and protection.82 e connection between 
citizenship and political rights dates back even further, to Aristotelian notions 
of citizenship and their practical manifestation in the agoras of the Greek city 
 
 78 Where community membership is used as a basis for statutory discrimination, it is ‘residence’ 
(sometimes permanent residence) rather than citizenship that typically applies. On this basis, 
Rubenstein has concluded that ‘residents are oAen included as “Australian[s] in all but law”‘: 
Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 254, quoting Einfeld J in Minis-
ter for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic A?airs v Roberts (1993) 41 FCR 82, 86. See 
generally at ch 5. is assessment extends not only to rights conferred through legislation, 
but also to obligations owed — the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) remains the only 
statute which places obligations upon citizens but not on residents: Rubenstein, Australian 
Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 209. 
 79 Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 184. 
 80 For a description of some of the rights of Roman citizenship, see Derek Heater, A Brief 
History of Citizenship (Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 31–2; Sean A Adams, ‘Paul  
the Roman Citizen: Roman Citizenship in the Ancient World and its Importance for  
Understanding Acts 22:22–29’ in Stanley E Porter (ed), Paul: Jew, Greek, Roman (Brill, 2008), 
313–14. 
 81 See Gordon P Kelly, A History of Exile in the Roman Republic (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 33. 
 82 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Open University Press, 
2000) 11. 
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states.83 e connection between citizenship and entry and abode rights stems 
from the marriage between modern citizenship and the unit of the nation-
state, with its relatively Ixed territorial boundaries.84  
e relationship between citizenship and these rights is more than merely 
historical: the codiIcation of rights in these four categories remains very 
common globally.85 In Australia, as this Part will demonstrate, a person’s 
citizenship status is of great practical importance when determining the 
extent of their rights in these areas. However, this is rarely the result of the 
clear codiIcation of citizenship rights in statute. Moreover, rights in the four 
domains considered here do not always extend equally to all citizens. To an 
extent, this diMers from the treatment that rights in these categories are 
aMorded internationally. 
B  Status Protection Rights 
e notion of status protection rights for citizens more commonly arises in a 
constitutional context than in a statutory one. Protection of the status of 
citizens is provided for in several foreign constitutions, via a number of 
mechanisms. Some constitutions include deInitions of citizenship, which 
specify people who are entitled to hold the status, and serve as guarantees that 
it will not be stripped from people within this class.86 Other countries 
empower Parliament to determine who will hold citizenship through statute, 
but constitutionally protect against the deprivation of citizenship for some or 
all citizens.87 
 
 83 See, eg, Davidson, above n 27, 15–16. 
 84 See generally Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic 
Books, 1983). 
 85 As noted in Part I above, such codiIcation may occur constitutionally, in statute, or via a 
combination of the two. 
 86 Countries with such provisions in their constitutions include Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Colombia, Ecuador and the United States. See Constitution of Barbados ch II; Constituição da 
República Federativa do Brasil [Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil] art 12; 
Конституция на Република България [Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria] art 25; 
Constitución Politica de Colombia [Constitution of Colombia] art 96; Constitución del Ecua-
dor [Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador] title 1 ch II; United States Constitution amend 
XIV. All translations are by the Comparative Constitutions Project. 
 87 Countries with such constitutional provisions include Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia and Finland. See Канстытуцыя Рэспублікі Беларусь [Constitution of the Republic 
of Belarus] art 10; Ustav Republike Hrvastke [Constitution of the Republic of Croatia] art 9; 
Ústava České Republiky [Constitution of the Czech Republic] art 12; Eesti Vabariigi Põhisea-
dused [Constitution of Estonia] art 8; Suomen Perustuslaki [Constitution of Finland] s 5. 
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e Australian Constitution, by contrast, is silent on Australian citizenship 
and, accordingly, does not provide any express status protection for Australian 
citizens. e acquisition and loss of Australian citizenship are dealt with 
entirely under the ACA 2007. As noted in Part II(C) above, pt 2 div 3 of this 
Act sets out four ways in which a person’s citizenship may cease: via a 
successful application to renounce citizenship,88 by ministerial revocation 
where certain criteria speciIed in s 34 of the Act are met, as a result of service 
in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia,89 and via a general 
ministerial discretion to revoke the citizenship of a child where their respon-
sible parent has lost his or her Australian citizenship.90  Each of these  
four mechanisms is explored in more detail below, followed by a general 
analysis of citizenship protection in Australia relative to the UK, New Zealand 
and Canada. 
1 Renunciation of Citizenship  
e general capacity for renunciation of Australian citizenship is codiIed in 
s 33(1) of the Act. To renounce his or her citizenship, a person must make an 
application to the Minister.91 Cessation of citizenship is not guaranteed once 
such an application is made — it is contingent upon ministerial approval. As a 
general rule, such approval is required under s 33(3) where the applicant is 
over 18 and either holds foreign citizenship or is precluded by their Australian 
citizenship from obtaining citizenship of their country of birth or ordinary 
residence. However, the Minister may discretionally reject an application for 
renunciation where at the time of lodgement Australia is engaged in a war.92 
Further, applications must not be approved where the Minister determines 
that this would not be in the interests of Australia.93  
2 Ministerial Revocation of Citizenship 
Section 34 of the ACA 2007 confers upon the Minister power to revoke the 
citizenship of persons who gained citizenship by descent94 or conferral.95 is 
 
 88 ACA 2007 (Cth) s 33. 
 89 Ibid s 35. 
 90 Ibid s 36. 
 91 Ibid s 33(1). 
 92 Ibid s 33(5). 
 93 Ibid s 33(6). 
 94 Ibid s 34(1). 
 95 Ibid s 34(2). 
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revocation power may only be exercised where certain, relatively limited, 
criteria are satisIed. 
Revocation of a person’s citizenship is possible where the person has been 
convicted of a serious oMence in relation to their application for citizenship, or 
when citizenship was obtained through fraud, irrespective of whether the 
person’s citizenship was gained by descent or by conferral.96 Citizens by 
conferral may additionally have their citizenship revoked under s 34(2)(b)(ii) 
where, aAer lodgement of a citizenship application, but prior to the conferral 
of citizenship, they were convicted of a serious oMence of any nature. Howev-
er, where this is the sole basis for the revocation of a person’s citizenship, 
citizenship must not be revoked if it would render them stateless.97 is 
eMectively restricts the application of this element of the revocation power to 
persons who hold dual citizenship. 
In all cases, the power to revoke citizenship is contingent upon the Minis-
ter being satisIed that it would be ‘contrary to the public interest’ for the 
person in question to remain an Australian citizen.98 ere is no express 
statutory power that enables the revocation of the citizenship of a person who 
acquired citizenship ‘automatically’, under pt 2 div 1 of the Act. 
3 Service in the Armed Forces of an Enemy Country 
A person ceases to be an Australian citizen under s 35 of the Act if they serve 
in the armed forces of a country at war with Australia. As with s 34(2), 
cessation of citizenship under s 35 only occurs where the citizen in question 
holds nationality or citizenship of a foreign country in addition to Australian 
citizenship.99 Section 35 does not require that the person in question hold 
nationality or citizenship of the country in whose armed forces they serve — 
any dual citizenship suUces. It also seems that, unlike s 34, s 35 is not limited 
in its application to persons who gained citizenship by descent or by conferral 
— persons who gained citizenship ‘automatically’ remain vulnerable, provided 
they hold dual citizenship. Cessation of citizenship under s 35 occurs at the 
moment that service for the foreign country commences — ministerial 
revocation is not required.100  
 
 96 Ibid ss 34(1)(b), (2)(b). 
 97 Ibid s 34(3). 
 98 Ibid ss 34(1)(c), (2)(c). 
 99 Ibid s 35(1)(a). 
 100 Ibid s 35(2). 
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4 Ministerial Discretion to Revoke a Child’s Citizenship Where eir Parent 
Has Lost Citizenship 
e Inal basis upon which citizenship may be lost under the Act applies to 
the dependent children of persons who have ceased to be Australian citizens 
under ss 33, 34 or 35. Where a child in this category is under 18 years of age, 
the Minister may, in his or her discretion, choose to revoke the child’s 
citizenship. However, revocation must not occur where the child has another 
responsible parent who holds Australian citizenship,101 or where revocation 
would render the child stateless.102  
5 Analysis 
Generally speaking, the provisions in pt 2 div 3 of the ACA 2007 do not 
render the status of Australian citizens particularly vulnerable — citizenship 
may only be lost in clearly prescribed situations, ministerial discretions to 
revoke citizenship are not broad, and there are statutory protections in place 
to protect against a loss of citizenship where statelessness would ensue. 
Nonetheless, two factors limit the extent to which citizenship in Australia can 
be described as a ‘protected’ status. 
First, while the ACA 2007 prescribes relatively limited circumstances in 
which citizenship can be lost, the absence of any clear constitutional protec-
tion for the status of citizens is signiIcant. e provisions of the ACA 2007 — 
both those which confer citizenship upon people, and those which determine 
when it may be lost, are subject to appeal or amendment by Parliament. us, 
any status protection that Lows from the narrow statutory criteria that govern 
the cessation of citizenship under pt 2 div 3 of the Act is itself insecure, as the 
circumstances in which a person may lose their citizenship could quite easily 
be expanded by statutory amendment. Indeed, the question of which people 
ought to be entitled to hold Australian citizenship is one which has been 
revisited on several occasions by Parliament.103 Despite the fact that citizen-
ship is acquired ‘automatically’ by a person who is born in Australia to an 
 
 101 Ibid s 36(2)(a). 
 102 Ibid s 36(3). 
 103 For instance, when it was Irst enacted, s 10 of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 
automatically conferred statutory citizenship upon all persons born in Australia, provided 
their father was not a diplomat. In 1986, s 10(2) was amended to restrict citizenship by birth 
to persons born in Australia where at least one parent held citizenship or permanent resi-
dence: Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) s 4. e requirements for descent-
based citizenship have also shiAed over time, as has the entitlement to Australian citizenship 
of persons holding citizenship of other nations. 
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Australian parent, and that currently no ministerial revocation power exists 
under s 34 with respect to such a person, the statutory right to citizenship still 
falls far short of anything resembling constitutional status protection for 
natural-born citizens. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous A?airs; Ex parte Ame (‘Ame’),104 the High Court unanimously held 
that there is no conceptual barrier to a person having their citizenship status 
changed by Executive regulation, where the statutory framework in place 
provides for this.105 In this sense, the ‘status protection’ rights that Australian 
citizens hold are weaker than those held by citizens in countries where 
citizenship is a constitutionally protected status. 
Secondly, although statutory safeguards exist to protect citizens in all cate-
gories against the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, not all Australian 
citizenships are equal. Citizens who have gained their citizenship by descent 
or by conferral, for instance, are less protected than people who have acquired 
their citizenship ‘automatically’, as people in the latter category are not 
susceptible to having their citizenship revoked under s 34. 
In a similar vein, dual citizens are more vulnerable than citizens who hold 
Australian citizenship alone, who are protected by anti-statelessness provi-
sions against losing their citizenship under ss 34(3)(b), 34A(2) or 36(3). 
However, this added vulnerability is mitigated by the fact that the revocation 
powers aMorded to the Minister by s 34 are fairly narrow in comparison to 
those in other countries in which citizenship is regulated by statute. 
In New Zealand, as in Australia, citizenship may be revoked where it has 
been acquired by fraud, false representation, wilful concealment of infor-
mation or mistake.106 In addition, the Minister of Internal AMairs may deprive 
a dual citizen of New Zealand citizenship where they have voluntarily 
exercised any the privileges or performed any of the duties of their foreign 
citizenship ‘in a manner that is contrary to the interests of New Zealand’.107 
is deprivation power extends to persons who have voluntarily and formally 
acquired the nationality or citizenship of a foreign country other than by 
 
 104 (2005) 222 CLR 439. 
 105 It is worth noting, however, that this case related to a relatively unique type of Australian 
citizenship: that held by people born in the former Australian territory of Papua. See further 
Rubenstein, ‘e Lottery of Citizenship: e Changing SigniIcance of Birthplace, Territory 
and Residence to the Australian Membership Prize’, above n 1. 
 106 Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ) s 17; ACA 2007 s 34. 
 107 Ibid s 16(b). 
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marriage, and have subsequently acted in any manner contrary to the interests 
of New Zealand.108  
In the UK, 2006 amendments to the British Nationality Act 1981 (UK) c 61 
go signiIcantly further than both Australia and New Zealand, conferring 
upon the Secretary of State a wide power to deprive a person of citizenship 
status where ‘the Secretary of State is satisIed that deprivation is conducive to 
the public good’.109 As with the Australian and New Zealand revocation 
provisions, this power cannot be exercised where it would render a person 
stateless, and so in practice only applies to dual citizens.110  
In Canada, the circumstances in which a person may currently lose citi-
zenship under pt II of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 are, at present, 
more constrained: citizenship may be lost only where it is renounced, or 
where it has been obtained by fraud or the concealment of material circum-
stances. However, a private members bill introduced into the House of 
Commons in May 2012 proposes an amendment to this Act that would deem 
any citizen that holds dual citizenship to have made an application for 
renunciation of their Canadian citizenship if they engage in an act of war 
against the Canadian Armed Forces.111 Minister of Citizenship, Immigration 
 
 108 Ibid s 16(a). Notably, however, where the Minister makes such a deprivation order, a notice of 
intention to make the order must be served on the citizen in question: s 19(1). Upon being 
served such a notice, a person may apply within 28 days to the High Court for a declaration 
that there are ‘insuUcient grounds to justify the making of [a deprivation order]’: s 19(2). 
Where the Court makes such an order, the Minister is precluded from making another dep-
rivation order without fresh cause: s 19(4).  
 109 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (UK) c 13, s 56(1), amending British 
Nationality Act 1981 (UK) c 61, s 40(2). 
 110 British Nationality Act 1981 (UK) c 61, s 40(4). Proposed legislative changes which may 
expand the circumstances in which deprivation of UK citizenship may occur are currently 
under consideration by the UK Parliament. In January 2014, the House of Commons passed 
a proposed amendment in the Immigration Bill 2013–14, which would have allowed the 
Home Secretary to deprive a person who obtained UK citizenship by naturalisation of this 
citizenship, even if statelessness would ensue, where the person, while holding UK citizen-
ship, had conducted himself or herself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests 
of the UK: see Immigration Bill 2013–14 (HL Bill 84) cl 60. In April 2014, the House of 
Lords, in its Report stage, rejected this broad power, and instead approved an amendment 
which would establish a committee comprised of members of both houses of Parliament to 
consider and report on whether the current citizenship deprivation provision should be 
expanded: see Immigration Bill 2013–14 (HL Bill 98) cl 66. e third reading of the Bill is 
scheduled to take place in the House of Lords on 6 May 2014: see United Kingdom Parlia-
ment, Bills Before Parliament 2013-14: Public Bills: Immigration Bill 2013–14 (9 April 2014) 
<http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/immigration.html>. 
 111 Bill C-425, An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act (Honouring the Canadian Armed Forces), 
2012, cl 2. 
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and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, subsequently proposed that the Bill be 
expanded to provide for dual citizens to be deprived of Canadian citizenship 
where they engage in acts of terrorism.112 If passed, Bill C-425 in its original 
form would bring the deprivation provisions in the Canadian Citizenship Act 
largely into line with those in the ACA 2007. However, Kenney’s proposition 
would go signiIcantly further. 
e developments in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and the pro-
posals for legislative change in Canada, suggest potential lines along which the 
revocation provisions in pt 3 div 2 could be expanded in the future. While the 
commission of terrorist oMences, treason or action ‘contrary to the public 
interest’ in Australia does not currently render an Australian citizen vulnera-
ble to losing his or her citizenship, there are existing statutory provisions that 
could easily be drawn upon to include such situations amongst the circum-
stances in which citizenship may be lost. For instance, pt 5.1 of the Criminal 
Code (Cth) creates treason oMences where (inter alia): a person causes death 
or harm to the Sovereign, Governor-General or Prime Minister;113 ‘levies war, 
or does any act preparatory to levying war, against the Commonwealth’;114 
‘instigates a person who is not an Australian citizen to make an armed 
invasion of the Commonwealth or a Territory of the Commonwealth’;115 or, 
while Australia is at war with an enemy, intentionally assists the enemy to 
engage in war with the Commonwealth.116 Making the loss of citizenship a 
consequence of conviction for such oMences would seem to be an obvious 
extension of the existing provision in s 35 of the ACA 2007, and one that is 
foreseeable in light of international developments. 
C  Rights to Entry and Abode 
e broad category of ‘entry and abode rights’ encompasses two discrete types 
of rights: the right to come into Australian territory, and the right to remain in 
this territory. As this section will demonstrate, current statute law does not in 
either case grant clear, guaranteed rights to Australian citizens. Notwithstand-
ing this, the category remains one of the few areas in which the question of 
whether a person holds Australian citizenship is oAen of critical importance 
 
 112 Evidence to House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 
Parliament of Canada, Ottawa, 21 March 2013, 2–3 (Jason Kenney). 
 113 Criminal Code (Cth) ss 80.1(1)(a), (b), (c). 
 114 Ibid s 80.1(1)(d). 
 115 Ibid s 80.1(1)(g). 
 116 Ibid s 80.1AA(1). 
2014] e Rights and Responsibilities of Australian Citizenship 759 
when determining the level of protection that they enjoy. However, this has 
less to do with strong statutory rights protection for citizens, than with the 
existence of expansive statutes (passed under the wide ambit of the aliens and 
immigration powers) that apply exclusively to non-citizens. 
e prime example of such a statute is the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Mi-
gration Act’). e object of the Migration Act, expressed in s 4(1), is ‘to 
regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia 
of non-citizens’. To advance this object, the Migration Act establishes itself as 
‘the only source of the right of non-citizens to … enter or remain [in Austral-
ia]’,117 and ‘provides for the removal or deportation from Australia of non-
citizens whose presence in Australia is not permitted by [the] Act’.118 us, 
with respect to both the right to enter Australia and the right to abode within 
the country, the Migration Act subjects non-citizens to a degree of regulation 
that citizens do not face. 
1 e Right to Enter Australia  
Section 42(1) of the Migration Act provides that, with some limited excep-
tions, any non-citizen who wishes to enter Australia must possess a visa that is 
‘in eMect’. ere are various classes of visas, many of which do not authorise 
re-entry into Australia. us, permanent residents of Australia are oAen 
required to obtain an additional ‘Return (Residence) (Class BB) visa’ if they 
wish to leave and then re-enter Australia.119 Even where a non-citizen 
possesses a visa that authorises their return to Australia, re-entry to the 
country is not guaranteed: pt 2 div 3 sub-div D of the Migration Act provides 
that in certain circumstances, the Minister may cancel a non-citizen’s visa. 
is cancellation power is, however, limited by speciIed criteria.120 
Australian citizens, unlike non-citizens, do not need to obtain a visa under 
the Migration Act in order to re-enter Australia from overseas. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that Australian citizens have an ‘absolute right of 
re-entry’ into the country.121 
 
 117 Migration Act s 4(2). 
 118 Ibid s 4(4). 
 119 Section 42(1) of the Migration Act provides that, generally speaking, non-citizens may not 
travel to Australia without a visa that is in eMect. ere are two subclasses for the ‘Return 
(Residence) (Class BB) visa’: Migration Regulations 1994 sch 1 pt 1 cl 1128. Subclass 155 
authorises re-entry to Australia as a permanent resident for a Ive year period, while subclass 
157 provides this authorisation for a three month period: see Migration Regulations 1994 
sch 2. 
 120 See, eg, Migration Act s 116. 
 121 Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 230. 
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Section 4(3) of the Migration Act provides that the Act requires citizens, as 
well as non-citizens, to identify themselves upon entering Australia — 
although the purpose of this is expressed as being furtherance of the Migra-
tion Act’s object of regulating the entry into and presence in Australia of non-
citizens. e key provision to this end is s 166(1), which requires both citizens 
and non-citizens to present identiIcation evidence for immigration clearance 
when entering Australia. For Australian citizens, this identiIcation evidence 
typically consists of the person’s passport.122 
In order to be issued with an Australian passport, a person must be an 
Australian citizen. However, citizenship does not give rise to any absolute 
right to hold a passport.123 While s 7 of the Australian Passports Act 2005 
(Cth) creates a general entitlement for a citizen to be issued with a passport 
upon application to the Minister for Foreign AMairs, this entitlement is subject 
to pt 2 div 2 of the Act, which sets out a number of situations in which the 
Minister may, in the exercise of executive discretion, refuse to issue a pass-
port. ese circumstances include where a child has applied for a passport in 
the absence of parental consent,124 and where a ‘competent authority’ reason-
ably believes that reasons relating to Australian125 or international126 law 
enforcement arise, or reasonably suspects that if a particular person were 
issued with an Australian passport, he or she would be likely to engage in 
speciIed kinds of ‘harmful conduct’.127 However, as Helen Irving has noted, 
some of the potential reasons for denial of a passport ‘include matters having 
no direct bearing on a person’s “character” as a citizen’.128 Section 15, for 
instance, allows the Minister to refuse to issue a passport to a person where 
they have had two or more passports lost or stolen in the preceding Ive years. 
Further, s 22(1) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) creates a general 
ministerial power to cancel a citizen’s passport. Section 22(2) provides a 
number of speciIc situations in which this power to cancel may be exercised, 
without limiting the scope of s 22(1). Included within the scope of sub-s (2) is 
a power to cancel a passport where a ‘competent authority’ has made a request 
 
 122 Migration Act s 166(1)(a)(i). See also Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, 
above n 9, 230 n 207 for an overview of other identiIcation evidence which may be pre-
scribed under this section. 
 123 Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home’, above n 1, 140. 
 124 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 11. 
 125 Ibid s 12. 
 126 Ibid s 13. 
 127 Ibid s 14. 
 128 Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home’, above n 1, 140 n 57. 
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for cancellation under s 14(1).129 is power was invoked to cancel the 
passport of former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mamdouh Habib upon his 
return to Australia in 2005.130 
Refusal or cancellation of a citizen’s passport deprives that citizen of the 
right to travel abroad. If a person’s passport is cancelled while they are 
overseas, the cancellation would, in a practical sense, deprive them of the 
capacity to re-enter Australia. is suggests that while regulation of the entry 
rights of non-citizens might be more common as a matter of everyday 
practice, citizens are not immunised through legislation against exclusion 
from Australian territory.131  
2 e Right to Remain or Reside in Australia 
e other major vulnerability of non-citizens under the Migration Act relates 
to their susceptibility to expulsion from the country. Division 9 of pt 2 of the 
Act creates a number of deportation powers that operate with respect to 
certain non-citizens. Permanent residents are not excluded from the opera-
tion of these powers, and the threshold that must be passed to give rise to 
potential deportation is not always high. For instance, under s 201, a person 
may be rendered vulnerable to deportation if, within 10 years of attaining 
permanent residency, he or she committed an oMence and was sentenced to at 
least one year’s imprisonment. However, s 201 has largely fallen into disuse, 
on account of the insertion of the even broader s 501, which allows for the 
revocation of a non-citizen’s visa where the Minister is not satisIed that he or 
she passes the character test set out in s 501(6), irrespective of the number of 
years he or she has spent in Australia. Section 501(6)(a) provides that a person 
 
 129 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 22(2)(d). 
 130 See Habib v Minister for Foreign A?airs and Trade (2010) 192 FCR 148. 
 131 e question of whether it is legally permissible for the Commonwealth to prevent an 
Australian citizen from entering Australia on the grounds that they do not hold a valid pass-
port has not been tested before the courts. Arguably, the Australian Constitution or the  
common law may provide a degree of protection for citizens in this circumstance. For in-
stance, Irving has argued that citizens have a constitutionally protected right of abode in 
Australia: Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home’, above n 1, 141. George Williams and David 
Hume have also suggested that, pursuant to Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, the com-
mon law principle of legality presumptively protects against abrogation of ‘the freedom of 
individuals to re-enter their home country’: George Williams and David Hume, Human 
Rights Under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 42. However, 
the existence and extent of any such protection remains unresolved at present. It is also 
unclear whether, if such constitutional or common law protection were ultimately found to 
exist, the class of protected persons would map directly to the class of persons possessed of 
statutory citizenship. 
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does not pass the character test where he or she has a ‘substantial criminal 
record’, which, pursuant to s 501(7)(c), is satisIed where a sentence of 12 
months or more has been imposed. e other paras of s 501(7) outline 
additional circumstances in which the ‘substantial criminal record’ criterion is 
deemed to be satisIed for the purposes of the character test.132 Subsection 
7(e), in particular, greatly expands the class of persons captured by s 501 
beyond those who fall within s 201, by providing that a person will be taken to 
have a ‘substantial criminal record’ if they have been ‘acquitted of an oMence 
on the grounds of unsoundness of mind or insanity’ and, as a result, have 
been ‘detained in a facility or institution’. Cancellation of a visa under s 501 
leads to detention — potentially indeInite detention — pending removal 
from Australia, and ultimately deportation and permanent exclusion from the 
country.133 As Michelle Foster has noted, s 501 has been increasingly applied 
to cancel the visas of long-term residents of Australia, many of whom arrived 
in the country as children.134  
ere is no power under current legislation that enables the deportation of 
Australian citizens. However, this does not mean that their right to reside in 
Australia is unqualiIed. For instance, the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) provides 
for the extradition of persons from Australia, and — unlike extradition law in 
a number of countries — does not exclude Australian citizens from its 
scope.135 Additionally, certain types of citizens may once again be more 
vulnerable to exclusion than others, due to their potential capacity to qualify 
as constitutional aliens or immigrants. For example, in oral submissions in 
Ame, the Commonwealth suggested that citizens who had ‘live[d] overseas for 
more than three years’, or those who had been ‘born overseas of Australian 
parents’ and had gained citizenship by descent, could validly have their entry 
to Australia regulated pursuant to the immigration power.136 Such regulation 
 
 132 A person is also deemed to have a ‘substantial criminal record’ if they have been sentenced to 
death (sub-s (7)(a)), life imprisonment (sub-s (7)(b)) or two or more terms of imprison-
ment — whether the sentencing occurs on one or more occasions — where the total term of 
sentence amounts to two years or more (sub-s (7)(d)). Subsection 7(e) is discussed above in 
the discursive text. 
 133 See Michelle Foster, ‘“An ‘Alien’ by the Barest of reads” — e Legality of the Deportation 
of Long-Term Residents from Australia’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 483, 
484. 
 134 Ibid 485–6. 
 135 See further Part III(D)(1) below. 
 136 Transcript of Proceedings, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
A?airs; Ex parte Ame [2005] HCATrans 66 (3 March 2005) 73 (D M J Bennett QC). 
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does not presently exist,137 and this interpretation of the immigration power is 
debatable as a matter of constitutional law.138 However, the fact that scope for 
such arguments exists, combined with the lack of any express protection of 
entry and abode rights for Australian citizens, indicates that the security of 
such rights is not equal for all citizens. Other potentially vulnerable citizens 
include dual citizens, who, it has been argued, could conceivably qualify as 
constitutional aliens.139  
Although the entry and abode rights of Australian citizens are signiIcantly 
stronger than those of non-citizens, the category is one of the areas in which 
citizenship rights in Australia fall short of those protected in a number of 
countries. e UK, for instance, extends a formal right of abode to all British 
citizens140 — as well as to some non-citizens.141 e right of abode encom-
passes the freedom to both reside in the United Kingdom and to come and go 
from the territory without immigration control.142 In New Zealand, s 13 of the 
Immigration Act 2009 (NZ) expressly conIrms that New Zealand citizens, by 
virtue of their citizenship, have ‘the right to enter and be in New Zealand at 
 
 137 While the Migration Act in its current form purports to regulate the entry to and presence in 
Australia of ‘non-citizens’, this was not always the reference point for determining its scope. 
Historical versions of the statute sought to regulate the entry into Australia of ‘immigrants’, 
under the ambit of the constitutional immigration power: see Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous A?airs v Walsh (2002) 125 FCR 31, 35–6 [16]–[17] (Heerey, 
MansIeld and Hely JJ). 
 138 In response to such suggestions Kirby J stated: ‘We do not really have to resolve it in this case, 
but I really doubt that you could impose a duty on any Australian citizen to get a visa or 
something, some permission to get back into Australia because they are just not immigrants. 
ey are not within the immigration power’: Transcript of Proceedings, Re Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous A?airs; Ex parte Ame [2005] HCATrans 66 (3 
March 2005) 73. Gummow J also stressed that the argument was not central to the case, but 
suggested it ventured into ‘dangerous waters’: Transcript of Proceedings, Re Minister for 
immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous A?airs; Ex parte Ame [2005] HCATrans 66 (3 
March 2005) 74. is suggests that, should an appropriate case arise, the latent potential of 
the immigration power to extend to authorise laws of the kind suggested may be closed oM by 
the Court. Both Gummow and Kirby JJ have, however, since retired from the High Court. 
 139 See, eg, Kim Rubenstein, ‘From Supranational to Dual to Alien Citizen: Australia’s Ambiva-
lent Journey’ in Simon Bronitt and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Citizenship in a Post-National 
World: Australia and Europe Compared (Federation Press, 2008) 47. 
 140 Immigration Act 1971 (UK) c 77, s 2(1)(a). It is worth noting, however, that there are other 
types of British nationality provided for in the British Nationality Act 1981 (UK) c 61 — for 
instance the statuses of ‘British Dependent Territories Citizen’ (pt II) and ‘British Overseas 
Citizen’ (pt III). Persons holding these statuses do not hold the same abode rights as those 
who hold ‘British citizen’ status (pt I). 
 141 Immigration Act 1971 (UK) c 77, s 2(1)(b). 
 142 Ibid s 1(1). 
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any time’,143 and that ‘no New Zealand citizen is liable to deportation under 
[the Immigration Act] in any circumstances’.144 In Canada, citizens have a 
constitutionally protected right to ‘enter, remain in and leave Canada’, under 
s 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘Canadian Charter’).145 
e right is one of the few Canadian Charter rights that cannot be displaced 
by an express parliamentary declaration that a provision or piece of legislation 
shall operate ‘notwithstanding’ the Canadian Charter right aMected.146 It may, 
however, be limited by s 1, which guarantees the rights and freedoms set out 
in the Canadian Charter but provides that these rights and freedoms may be 
subject to ‘such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justiIed in a free and democratic society’. us, the extradition of Canadian 
citizens has oAen been upheld: although extradition falls foul of s 6, the need 
to combat illegal activity is a reasonable limit for the purposes of s 1.147 In 
Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister of Foreign A?airs),148 s 6 was held to give rise to 
a positive obligation requiring the Canadian government to issue an emergen-
cy passport to a citizen to facilitate his re-entry to Canada.149 In relation to the 
United States, it has been held that ‘the only absolute and unqualiIed right of 
citizenship is to residence within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States’.150 Many countries also provide express constitutional recognition of 
entry or abode rights for citizens.151 
 
 143 Immigration Act 2009 (NZ) s 13(1). Section 13(2), however, provides that in order to establish 
his or her right to enter New Zealand, a New Zealand citizen must prove his or her citizen-
ship and establish his or her identity by complying with border requirements. 
 144 Ibid s 13(3)(b). 
 145 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I. 
 146 e capacity for Parliament to issue such declarations is enshrined in s 33 of the Canadian 
Charter, and enables the circumvention of the rights codiIed in s 2 and ss 7–15. e provi-
sion, however, has rarely been relied upon. 
 147 See, eg, United States of America v Cotroni [1989] 1 SCR 1469. e fairness of a particular 
extradition is not typically an issue under s 6, but where a particular extradition is not ‘in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’, it may be held invalid under s 7 of the 
Canadian Charter: see, eg, Canada v Schmidt [1987] 1 SCR 500; United States v Burns [2001] 
1 SCR 283. 
 148 [2010] 1 FCR 267. 
 149 While refusal to issue an emergency passport is prima facie a breach of s 6, the refusal will 
nonetheless be constitutionally permissible where the government can demonstrate that the 
refusal was in accordance with a ‘reasonable limit’, for the purposes of s 1 of the Canadian 
Charter. e refusal in Abdelrazik did not meet this threshold: Abdelrazik v Canada (Minister 
of Foreign A?airs) [2010] 1 FCR 267, 334–5 [156]–[157] (Zinn J). 
 150 United States of America v Valentine, 288 F Supp 957, 980 (D PR, 1968) (Cancio J). 
 151 ese countries include Albania, Bahrain, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia and 
South Africa: see Kushtetuta e Republikës së Shqipërisë [Constitution of the Republic of Alba-
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e Australian statutory regime with respect to the entry and abode rights 
of citizens has the capacity to develop in two opposite directions. On the one 
hand, the existence of express citizenship rights in countries such as Canada, 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, where the notion of citizenship shares 
similar roots, might suggest the eventual evolution of express rights in this 
area.152 On the other hand, the constitutional potential for the entry and 
abode of certain citizens to be regulated under the aliens or immigration 
powers may facilitate future legislative attempts to create express distinctions 
between the extent to which diMerent classes of citizens enjoy rights in  
this category. 
D  Rights to Protection 
e phrase ‘rights to protection’ refers broadly to state duties that may be 
invoked by citizens in need. ere are two common ways in which such rights 
are recognised. e Irst comes in the form of protection — either absolute or 
qualiIed — against the extradition of citizens to foreign countries.153 e 
second involves the existence of state obligations to extend consular assistance 
or diplomatic protection to citizens detained overseas.154 In many cases, the 
 
nia] art 38(1); Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain art 17(b); Constitution de la République 
Démocratique du Congo [Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo] art 30; Eesti 
Vabariigi Põhiseadused [Constitution of the Republic of Estonia] s 36; Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa s 21(3). e extent of constitutional protection varies between coun-
tries. Some countries, including Ethiopia and Finland, also grant constitutionally protected 
entry, abode or mobility rights to non-citizens, oAen of a lesser nature than the rights held by 
citizens: see, eg, ሕገ መንግስት [Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] 
art 32(1); Suomen Perustuslaki [Constitution of Finland] s 9. 
 152 Helen Irving has argued that there is scope for the development of a constitutional citizens’ 
right of abode in Australia, in part on the basis that abode rights are ‘conceptually inseparable 
from citizenship’: Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home’, above n 1, 141. 
 153 Countries that have constitutionally codiIed such protections include Brazil, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, Guinea-Bissau and Switzerland: see Constituição da República Federativa 
do Brasil [Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil] art 5(LI); Listina Základních 
Práv a Svobod [Czech Constitutional Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] 
art 14(4); Suomen Perustuslaki [Constitution of Finland] s 9; Grundgesetz für die Bundesre-
publik Deutschland [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany] art 16(2); Constituição 
da República da Guiné-Bissau [Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau] art 34; Bun-
desverfassung der Schweizerischen EidgenossenschaY [Federal Constitution of the Swiss Con-
federation] art 25(1). 
 154 Countries that have constitutionally codiIed such protections include Ecuador: see 
Constitución del Ecuador [Constitution of Ecuador] art 40(3). Other countries, including 
Afghanistan, Belarus, Bulgaria and Croatia, take a more general approach, and assert that the 
state will protect the rights of citizens abroad. See Constitution of Afghanistan art 39; 
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codiIcation of protective rights in both these categories is achieved through 
constitutional provision, though a number of countries supplement this 
through legislation.155 In Australia, there are no clear statutory citizenship 
rights in either category. 
1 Protection Against Extradition 
Australian extradition law does not discriminate on the basis of citizenship, or 
even of residency. As noted above, the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) facilitates 
the extradition of both citizens and non-citizens, and the criteria that govern 
extradition do not change depending on whether or not the person whose 
extradition is sought holds citizenship. In Vasiljkovic v Commonwealth,156 it 
was argued that the extradition of an Australian citizen was not permissible 
under Australian law. e High Court rejected this argument. Gleeson CJ 
stated that: ‘[t]here is nothing in the Act or Regulations that seeks to attach 
any legal signiIcance to the fact that the plaintiM was at the relevant time a 
citizen of Australia’.157 
A number of foreign countries constitutionally protect against the extradi-
tion of citizens.158 While in some cases, the prohibition on such extradition is 
absolute,159 oAen it is more limited.160 Many countries qualify constitutional 
 
Канстытуцыя Рэспублікі Беларусь [Constitution of the Republic of Belarus] art 59; 
Конституция на Република България [Constitution of Bulgaria] art 25(5); Ustav Republike 
Hrvastke [Constitution of the Republic of Croatia] art 10. 
 155 In Canada, for instance, limited protection against extradition in certain circumstances is 
achieved through a combination of ss 1, 6 and 7 of the Canadian Charter and the Extradition 
Act, SC 1999, c 18. Similarly, in Costa Rica, limited protection against extradition is secured 
through the Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica [Political Constitution of the 
Republic of Costa Rica] art 31 [Comparative Constitutions Project Trans] and the Extradition 
Act 1971 (No 4795). CodiIed rights to diplomatic protection or assistance are more oAen 
found in constitutions than in statutes, and are oAen draAed in very general terms: see above 
n 154. However, some examples of legislative codiIcation of protective rights can be found, 
for example, in the United States: see, eg, 22 USC § 1732 (2012). In Canada, once again, a 
hybrid model applies — rights to protection are secured through a combination of s 7 of the 
Canadian Charter and the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, SC 1991, 
c 41. 
 156 (2006) 227 CLR 614. 
 157 Ibid 619 [8]. 
 158 See above n 153. 
 159 For example, Конституция Российской Федерации [Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion] art 61(1) prohibits the deportation or extradition of Russian citizens. In a similar vein, 
Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen EidgenossenschaY [Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation] art 25 prohibits the expulsion of any Swiss citizen, or the extradition of any 
citizen to a foreign authority without the citizen’s consent. 
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prohibitions on extradition with provisions that extradition is possible where 
the rule of law, human rights or international treaties are complied with. For 
example, art 9 of the Constitution of Finland prohibits the extradition of 
citizens, but qualiIes this by providing that extradition is possible in accord-
ance with law to countries where ‘human rights and legal protection  
are guaranteed’.161  
In Australia, the extradition process prescribed by the Extradition Act 1988 
(Cth) precludes the surrender of an otherwise eligible person for extradition 
where an ‘extradition objection’ arises under s 7 of the Act.162 Extradition 
objections arise where the person’s extradition has been sought for a political 
oMence in relation to the extradition country,163 or where, despite purporting 
to be for a legitimate extradition oMence, the person’s surrender ‘is actually 
sought for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of 
his or her race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationality or political 
opinions or for a political oMence in relation to the extradition country’.164 An 
objection also arises where there is a risk that the person, if extradited, may 
face prejudice at trial, or punishment, detention or restriction in his or her 
personal liberty, by reason of ‘race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, nationali-
ty or political opinions’.165 Extradition under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) is 
also precluded where there are substantial grounds for believing that it would 
place the extradited person in danger of being subjected to torture,166 or 
where there is a risk that they may be subjected to the death penalty.167 us, 
the statute includes many of the protections that are constitutionally secured 
 
 160 A number of countries, including Belarus and Bulgaria for instance, constitutionally prohibit 
the extradition of citizens except where the extradition is in accordance with a treaty to 
which the nation is a party: see, eg, Канстытуцыя Рэспублікі Беларусь [Constitution of the 
Republic of Belarus] art 10; Конституция на Република България [Constitution of Bulgar-
ia] art 25(4). Other constitutions only permit the extradition of citizens to countries where 
the human rights and legal protection of the citizen are guaranteed: see, eg, Suomen Pe-
rustuslaki [Constitution of Finland] s 9. 
 161 Suomen Perustuslaki [Constitution of Finland]. 
 162 See Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 19(2)(d), 22(3)(a). 
 163 Ibid s 7(a). 
 164 Ibid s 7(b). 
 165 Ibid s 7(c). Additional grounds for extradition objections are provided for in ss 7(d)–(e). 
 166 Ibid ss 15B(3)(a), 22(3)(b). 
 167 Ibid ss 15B(3)(b), 22(3)(c)(ii). 
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for citizens in foreign countries, but extends these protections to non-citizens 
as well.168  
Extradition statutes in the UK, New Zealand and Canada include protec-
tive provisions of a similar nature to those in the Extradition Act 1988 
(Cth). 169  In each of these countries, however, protection is augmented 
somewhat by the existence of a bill of rights. Section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK) c 42 provides that legislation, so far as possible, must be given 
eMect in a way which is compatible with the rights guaranteed in the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘European 
Convention on Human Rights’).170 is provision was relied upon to deny the 
extradition to the United States of computer hacker Gary McKinnon.171 
Similarly, s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) provides that 
‘[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be 
preferred to any other meaning’. In Canada, various sections of the Canadian 
Charter impact on the legal framework for extradition. e extradition of 
Canadian citizens has been held to infringe s 6(1) of the Canadian Charter, 
which protects the entry, abode and mobility rights of Canadian citizens. 
However, as the need to combat illegal activities gives rise to a reasonable 
limit for the purposes of s 1 of the Canadian Charter, the s 6(1) infringement 
posed by extradition is typically a permissible one.172 In practice, constitu-
 
 168 It is worth noting that some countries that set constitutional limits on extradition also extend 
these protections to non-citizens. For instance, the Constitution of Greece expressly prohibits 
the extradition of ‘aliens prosecuted for their actions as freedom-Ighters’: see Σύνταγμα 
[Constitution of Greece] art 5(2). 
 169 See Extradition Act 2003 (UK) c 41, ss 79–83, 87; Extradition Act 1999 (NZ) ss 7–8; 
Extradition Act, SC 1999, c 18, ss 44–7. 
 170 Opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 
1953). 
 171 See, eg, Alan Travis and Owen Bowcott, ‘Gary McKinnon Will not Be Extradited to US, 
eresa May Announces’, e Guardian (online), 17 October 2012 <http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/world/2012/oct/16/gary-mckinnon-not-extradited-may>; Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Gary 
McKinnon: eresa May Had No Choice But to Use Human Rights Grounds’, e Guardian 
(online), 17 October 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/oct/16/gary-mckinnon-
theresa-may-human-rights>. 
 172 See United States of America v Cotroni [1989] 1 SCR 1469. Interference with the entry, abode 
and mobility rights protected under s 6(1) of the Canadian Charter has been held to be 
justiIable even where the persons with respect to whom extradition was sought faced the risk 
of the death penalty, on the grounds that the death penalty is ‘only marginally a mobility 
rights issue’: see United States v Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283, 317 [48]. However, in this case, the 
extradition was blocked anyway by virtue of s 7 of the Canadian Charter: at 353–60 [124]–
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tional limits are more likely to Low from s 7, which provides that ‘[e]veryone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice’. Extradition may violate the ‘principles of fundamental justice’ if the 
nature of criminal procedures or potential penalties in the extradition country 
‘shock[] the conscience’,173 or if the surrender of the person would ‘oMend[] 
against the basic demands of justice’.174 Extraditions where the extradited 
person may face the death penalty have been held to infringe s 7,175 but the 
risk of a severe prison term has been held not to suUce.176 Notably, unlike s 6, 
the protection that stems from s 7 does not only Low to Canadian citizens, but 
extends to all persons. 
e absence of a bill of rights in Australia potentially means that protec-
tions against extradition on human rights grounds are more limited than in 
the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. Nonetheless, a number of 
human rights protections are encoded in the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth).177 
Moreover, as in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, there is no 
discrimination in the level of protection aMorded to citizens and non-citizens, 
as citizenship is not made a precursor for basic human rights protection. 
2 Rights to Consular Assistance and Diplomatic Protection 
Part 2 of the Australian Consular Operations Handbook governs the provision 
of consular services to Australians overseas and contains guidelines with 
respect to services provided in relation to the welfare of Australians abroad.178 
Chapter 4 of this Part states that ‘[t]he Department aims to give humanitarian 
assistance to Australian citizens and permanent residents whose welfare is at 
risk abroad, while respecting their rights to privacy’,179 and generally provides 
guidance on the services that travellers and their families can expect with 
 
[143] (McLachlin CJ, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, 
Arbour and LeBel JJ). 
 173 Canada v Schmidt [1987] 1 SCR 500, 522 (La Forest J for Dickson CJ, Beetz, McIntyre, Le 
Dain and La Forest JJ). 
 174 Ibid 523. 
 175 United States v Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283. 
 176 See, eg, United States v Jamieson [1996] 1 SCR 465; United States v Whitley [1996] 1 SCR 467; 
United States v Ross [1996] 1 SCR 469. 
 177 See above nn 162–167 and accompanying text. 
 178 Department of Foreign AMairs and Trade, Australian Consular Operations Handbook 
(February 2013) <http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/consular-operations-handbook/>. 
 179 Ibid [4.1]. 
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respect to matters such as missing persons,180 health and medical issues181 and 
assault.182 Chapter 6 of pt 2 deals with consular services in relation to Austral-
ians arrested or detained overseas. Paragraph 6.1 states that:  
Consular protection in the case of arrested, detained or imprisoned people 
means ensuring, as far as possible that:  
• Australians arrested, detained or imprisoned overseas are able to see an 
Australian consular oUcer and receive consular assistance 
• Australians overseas charged with oMences against local law or otherwise 
punished have access to appropriate legal defence and receive a fair trial 
under local law 
• Australians imprisoned overseas are treated no less favourably than local 
citizens conIned for similar oMences 
• e basic needs of Australian prisoners are met and the prisoners enjoy 
humanitarian standards of prisoner welfare. 
Chapter 6 generally contains a number of guidelines outlining how consular 
oUcers should proceed with respect to ‘Australians arrested or detained 
overseas’. Whether these guidelines apply exclusively to matters concerning 
Australian citizens, or whether they extend to cover permanent residents (as 
the provisions in ch 4 do)183 is not clariIed. Chapter 6 states that consular 
oUcials should: attempt to visit arrested or detained Australians at the earliest 
opportunity;184 show a continuing interest in the welfare of Australians 
imprisoned overseas, irrespective of the nature of the crimes they have 
allegedly committed;185 provide additional assistance where the Australian in 
question is a minor;186 inform a nominated next of kin of the situation if the 
prisoner wishes it;187 attempt to attend court where an Australian citizen is 
 
 180 Ibid [4.6]–[4.7], [4.13]. 
 181 Ibid [4.14]–[4.15]. 
 182 Ibid [4.17]–[4.21]. 
 183 Ibid [4.1]. 
 184 Ibid [6.3], [6.7]. 
 185 Ibid [6.4]. 
 186 Ibid [6.12]. 
 187 Ibid [6.13]. 
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charged with a criminal oMence; 188  and in certain circumstances make 
informal and, occasionally, formal representations on behalf of prisoners.189 
SigniIcantly, as the Australian Consular Operations Handbook expressly 
states, it is not a legal document, and is ‘not intended to create any legally 
binding duties or obligations on the Australian Government to provide any 
particular consular assistance or services’.190 Australian legislation is silent on 
the question of what consular service duties, if any, the Australian government 
owes to citizens who encounter trouble overseas. Similarly, there is no 
statutory duty for the government to extend diplomatic protection to a citizen 
who is wronged by a foreign power. In Hicks v Ruddock,191 David Hicks who, 
at the time of litigation had been detained in Guantanamo Bay for in excess of 
Ive years, argued that the Australian government owed him a ‘“diplomatic 
duty” of protection’, which, though it could not be enforced ‘as of right’, 
precluded the government from taking into account considerations irrelevant 
to the duty to protect when exercising its discretion.192 However, this argu-
ment was made by reference to common law and constitutional principles, 
rather than by reference to any legislative duty.193  
It has been argued that as a matter of political reality, consular assistance 
and diplomatic protection are oAen necessarily conducted behind closed 
doors.194 is suggests that there is a need for some Lexibility and discretion 
 
 188 Ibid [6.15] 
 189 Ibid [6.22]–[6.24]. 
 190 Ibid Introduction. 
 191 (2007) 156 FCR 574 (‘Hicks’). 
 192 Ibid 594 [66] (Tamberlin J). 
 193 e plaintiM in Hicks drew on UK common law cases to argue for the existence of a protective 
duty owed by the Australian government to David Hicks, as a citizen. e duty, it was argued, 
was applicable in Australia through the executive power in s 61 of the Constitution. e 
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did not oblige the government to extend protection to Hicks: ibid 593 [61]. However, it was 
contended that the duty compelled the government to consider Hicks’ request for protection, 
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novel … it does not follow that it has no reasonable prospects of success’: ibid 600 [92]. 
However, as Hicks ultimately pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him by the US, 
proceedings did not progress further. Consequently, the status of the legal arguments raised 
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 194 For a summary of such arguments, see Craig Forcese, ‘e Obligation to Protect: e Legal 
Context for Diplomatic Protection of Canadians Abroad’ (2007) 57 University of New Bruns-
wick Law Journal 102, 108. 
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when providing such services. e Australian Consular Operations Handbook 
stresses this point. Paragraph 6.1 states: 
e arrest or detention of Australians overseas is a complex issue in consular 
protection. People arrested or detained require sensitive and well-considered 
assistance, possibly over an extended period. Sound guidance and policy direc-
tion may be required in handling bilateral relations in these cases. e nature of 
the crime committed or the long-term nature of detention may attract media 
and parliamentary interest in Australia, calling for careful and considered re-
sponses by Government and the Department. 
Nonetheless, the perception of inaction on the part of the Australian govern-
ment, in a series of high proIle cases involving allegations of serious mis-
treatment of Australian citizens at the hands of foreign states — for example, 
the detention and alleged torture of Hicks195 and fellow Guantanamo Bay 
inmate Mamdouh Habib by the United States,196 the cases of Stern Hu197 and 
Julian Assange198 and, most recently, of ‘Prisoner X’ Ben Zygier, who in 2010 
hanged himself while imprisoned in a maximum security Israeli jail199 — have 
on occasion given rise to suggestions that a minimum standard of care ought 
to be established under the law.200 
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December 2012) <http://wlcentral.org/node/2784>. 
 199 Felix PatrikeeM, ‘Ben Zygier: e Silence Surrounding Prisoner X’, e Conversation (online), 
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In 2007, the Australian Democrats introduced the Repatriation of Citizens 
Bill 2007 (Cth) into Parliament. In the second reading speech for the Bill, 
Senator Lyn Allison stated that it had been motivated by ‘the failure of current 
laws to protect the human and legal rights of Australian citizen, Mr David 
Hicks, following his capture by the United States authorities in Afghanistan in 
2003’.201 e Bill sought to require the Attorney-General to ‘use all appropri-
ate and available channels and opportunities’ to request the release and 
surrender to Australia of an Australian citizen detained by a foreign power, in 
particular circumstances.202 ese circumstances were prescribed in cl 6, 
which required the Attorney-General to request repatriation where, aAer 
investigating the matter, he or she concluded that: (a) there was ‘excessive 
delay in bringing the citizen to trial’; (b) the conditions of detention were 
‘cruel or inhumane’; (c) the citizen faced corporal punishment or the death 
penalty; (d) the pre-trial and trial process had not been fair by international 
standards; or (e) there would be an infringement of the citizen’s human rights 
under any international human rights treaty or convention to which Australia 
was a party. Clause 6 also prescribed the procedure which the Attorney-
General was required to adopt when investigating claims. 
e Repatriation of Citizens Bill 2007 (Cth) ultimately lapsed in 2008.  
It has been suggested that, if passed, it would have been one of the Irst 
statutes of its kind in the world.203 Another example can be found in the 
Foreign Relations and Intercourse Title in the United States Code,204 which 
goes considerably further than the Repatriation of Citizens Bill 2007 (Cth). 
Section 1732 of this Title of the Code imposes upon the President a duty to, 
upon receiving knowledge that a US citizen has been deprived of liberty by a 
foreign government, demand the reasons for imprisonment. Where the 
imprisonment ‘appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of 
American citizenship’, the President must demand the citizen’s release.205 If 
release is ‘unreasonably delayed or refused’, the President is required to use all 
legal means that he thinks necessary or proper to obtain or eMectuate the 
release, short of acts of war.206 
 
 201 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 March 2007, 8. 
 202 Repatriation of Citizens Bill 2007 (Cth) cl 5. 
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Recently, in a public lecture, Donald Rothwell argued that Australia ought 
to enact a Consular Services Act that expressly enshrines the ‘right of consular 
assistance’ in Australian law and establishes minimum standards that gov-
ernments are required to meet when providing assistance to Australians 
overseas.207 Rothwell argued that such legislation should ‘make clear [both] 
the capacity of the Australian government to represent Australians overseas’, 
as well as ‘the legal entitlement of citizens to [such] representations’.208 He also 
stressed that laws that guarantee legal protection for citizens in foreign 
countries exist in ‘countries as diverse as Brazil, Kazakhstan, Hungary, China, 
Estonia and Germany’.209  
In Canada, s 3 of the Foreign Missions and International Organizations 
Act210 gives force of Canadian law to several articles of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations,211 including those that create state obligations to 
nationals.212 In the United Kingdom, the equivalent is achieved through the 
Consular Relations Act 1968.213 Both these countries also make a number of 
policy documents available online via government websites.214 New Zealand 
mirrors Australia in that no statute governs the provision of consular services. 
In all four countries it is noted that while dual citizens are entitled to access 
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consular assistance, their ability to do so may be limited in certain situations, 
due to international or foreign law constraints.215 Of the four countries, 
Australia alone expressly states that consular assistance generally extends to 
permanent residents.216 
e simultaneous extension of certain protections to Australian perma-
nent residents and the acknowledgement that full protection may not Low to 
Australian citizens who hold dual citizenship raises questions about the extent 
to which statutory citizenship can correctly be described as the gateway to 
protective rights in Australia, and the extent to which the rights held by 
citizens can be described as equal in nature. ese questions are underlined 
by the fact that, at least with respect to consular assistance and diplomatic 
protection, no rights are expressly guaranteed to citizens, giving rise to the 
possibility that protection may be extended unequally to diMerent citizens, or 
denied to some citizens altogether. 
E  Political Rights 
e Inal category in which this article will consider the existence of citizens’ 
rights in Australia is that of political membership. As Rubenstein has noted, 
‘membership of the political community is … determined by citizenship 
status’ — at least to the extent that the ‘political community’ is deIned by 
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reference to the class of people who may exercise the vote, and the people who 
sit in Parliament as representatives of the voters.217 
Eligibility to vote in Australian federal elections is governed by the Com-
monwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (‘Commonwealth Electoral Act’). Prior to 
1984, eligibility was not restricted to Australian citizens — rather, any adult 
who held British subject status and had resided in Australian for at least six 
months could exercise the vote. In 1984, signiIcant amendments were made 
to the Act, including the substantial restriction of voting rights to persons 
over the age of 18 who hold Australian citizenship.218 However, as a transitory 
measure, British subjects who possessed voting rights at the time of this 
change were allowed to retain these rights.219  
Not all adult Australians are able to exercise voting rights. Sections 93(8) 
and 93(8AA) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act specify particular classes of 
excluded persons. A person is not entitled to be placed on the electoral roll or 
to vote if he or she is ‘of unsound mind’ and by virtue of this is ‘incapable of 
understanding the nature and signiIcance of enrolment and voting’,220 or if he 
or she has been convicted of treason or treachery, and has not received a 
pardon.221 Further, a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment of 
three years or longer cannot vote at any Senate or House of Representatives 
election,222 though they may remain on the electoral roll.223  
In 2006, amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act expanded the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners to include all persons serving a sentence of 
imprisonment, irrespective of its duration.224 In Roach v Electoral Commis-
sioner (‘Roach’),225 the High Court held that these amendments were uncon-
stitutional. While ss 8 and 30 of the Australian Constitution clearly stipulate 
the determination of qualiIcations for electors to be the ultimate decision of 
the Federal Parliament, the Court held that Parliament must exercise this 
power in a manner that is consistent with the constitutional requirement in 
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ss 7 and 24 that Parliament be ‘directly chosen by the people’.226 Essentially, 
this means that Parliament may only exclude people from exercising the 
franchise in a manner that is ‘appropriate and adapted to serve an end 
consistent or compatible with the maintenance of the [constitutionally] 
prescribed system of representative government’.227 Making voting rights 
contingent upon the possession of statutory citizenship — which, as the 
Preamble to the ACA 2007 states, represents ‘full and formal membership of 
the community of the Commonwealth of Australia’ — was held to satisfy this 
standard,228 however, a ‘substantial reason’ is needed for the disenfranchise-
ment of any group of adult citizens.229 Gleeson CJ held that a potential basis 
for the exclusion of citizens might be found in ‘conduct which manifests such 
a rejection of civic responsibility as to warrant temporary withdrawal of a 
civic right’.230 On this basis, the disenfranchisement of prisoners serving 
sentences in excess of three years was constitutionally permissible, but the 
blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners was not.231 
Voting in Australia is both a right as well as a statutory obligation.232 How-
ever, for Australian citizens who reside overseas, it is optional where the 
person intends to return to Australia within a six-year period.233 In order to 
retain voting rights while overseas, the citizen must register as an ‘eligible 
overseas elector’.234 Where the citizen in question intends to live overseas for 
in excess of six years, he or she is precluded from exercising the vote.235 
Citizenship is also relevant to the right to stand for political oUce at 
Commonwealth level. Eligibility criteria here are more restrictive. Sec-
tion 44(i) of the Australian Constitution provides that 
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[a]ny person who … is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or 
adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights 
or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power … shall be incapable of 
being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representa-
tives. 
While this provision does not, in its terms, demand that parliamentarians 
hold Australian citizenship, it eMectively requires this in practice. Moreover, 
s 44(i) has been interpreted to exclude dual citizens from standing  
for Parliament, on the basis that they hold allegiance to or citizenship of a 
foreign power.236 
Possession of Australian citizenship is not necessary for the exercise of all 
political rights. For example, the implied freedom of political communication 
that has been held to arise out of ss 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution is 
not restricted to citizens, but rather extends to all persons in Australia. While 
members of the High Court have aUrmed that aliens ‘have no constitutional 
right to participate in or to be consulted on matters of government’,237 the 
indirect conferral of the freedom of political communication upon aliens is 
necessary to maintain a ‘broad national environment in which the individual 
citizen exists and in which representative government must operate’.238 
e category of political rights is perhaps the only signiIcant area in which 
positive rights are conferred expressly and exclusively upon people who hold 
Australian citizenship, both at a statutory level as well as a constitutional level. 
e combination of these factors materially aMects the capacity for citizenship 
rights to change in this area. While Parliament has a general power to 
determine, through electoral law, the qualiIcations of electors, Roach and the 
subsequent case of Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (‘Rowe’)239 indicate that its 
capacity to exercise this power in a way that excludes Australian citizens from 
the franchise is relatively limited.240 Such exclusion cannot be legislated for 
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without a ‘substantial reason’ that is compatible with the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative democracy.241 
Both the linkage of political rights with citizenship and the exclusion of 
certain citizens from such rights are common internationally.242 e United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand each sit at diMerent points on the 
spectrum with respect to the political rights of citizens, with Australia 
adopting a ‘middle ground’ position comparatively. e United Kingdom, like 
Australia, determines voting rights and the right to stand for oUce through 
statute.243 In general, these rights are linked with British citizenship, though 
they also extend to certain non-citizens.244 All convicted prisoners serving 
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prison terms are currently denied the right to vote in United Kingdom general 
elections, though the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that this 
blanket ban on prisoner voting is incompatible with the European Convention 
on Human Rights.245 In New Zealand, voting rights are not limited to citizens: 
all citizens and permanent residents who have, at some time, resided continu-
ously in New Zealand for a period of at least one year are eligible to vote.246 In 
Canada, a combination of statutory and constitutional provisions apply. e 
Canada Elections Act 247 entitles all Canadian citizens over the age of 18 years 
to vote,248 but excludes any person who is ‘imprisoned in a correctional 
institution serving a sentence of two years or more’.249 is legislation is 
subject to s 3 of the Canadian Charter, which constitutionally guarantees 
Canadian citizens the right to vote at federal or provincial elections, and to be 
eligible for membership of parliament. e right in s 3 cannot be displaced by 
Parliament,250 however, it is subject to reasonable limits prescribed by law.251 
Political rights in Australia come close to qualifying as rights inextricably 
connected with citizenship. Unlike entry and abode rights, rights to protec-
tion, or even status protection rights, express statutory rights in this area are 
granted on the basis of citizenship. Additionally, Roach and Rowe suggest that 
these statutory citizenship rights attract a degree of constitutional protection. 
However, as Irving has argued, the capacity to describe voting rights as 
‘citizenship rights’ is frustrated by the fact that such rights ‘[do] not apply to 
all citizens, and because [they] still [apply] to a class of non-citizens’.252 
Further, the constitutional exclusion of dual citizens from eligibility for 
Parliament reinforces that in the realm of political rights — as in other 
arenas — not all citizens are equal. Nonetheless, the category of political 
rights provides perhaps the strongest indication of the existence of reciprocal 
rights and obligations that Low from citizenship. is idea is further explored 
in Part IV. 
 
 245 See, eg, Hirst v United Kingdom [No 2] [2005] IX Eur Court HR 187. 
 246 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 74(1). 
 247 SC 2000, c 9. 
 248 Ibid s 3. 
 249 Ibid s 4(c). 
 250 Canadian Charter s 33. 
 251 Ibid s 1. 
 252 Irving, ‘Still Call Australia Home’, above n 1, 140. 
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IV  THE ‘RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS ’  OF  C IT IZENS  
e Preamble to the ACA 2007 describes Australian statutory citizenship as ‘a 
common bond, involving reciprocal rights and responsibilities’. While this 
description does not, of itself, have legal force, it has attracted some judicial 
aUrmation. For instance, in Roach, Gleeson CJ stated that the reciprocity of 
citizenship rights and obligations is ‘important in the context of membership 
of the community’.253  
e idea that the rights of citizenship have reciprocal obligations was cen-
tral to Gleeson CJ’s decision in Roach. His Honour upheld the disenfran-
chisement of prisoners serving sentences of three years or longer on the 
grounds that ‘serious oMending’ amounts to a form of ‘civic irresponsibility’ 
that Parliament may appropriately couple with temporary ‘exclusion from the 
political rights of citizenship’.254 Further, his Honour stated:  
Emphasis upon civic responsibilities as the corollary of political rights and 
freedoms, and upon society’s legitimate interest in promoting recognition of re-
sponsibilities as well as acknowledgment of rights, has been inLuential in con-
temporary legal explanation of exclusions from the franchise as consistent with 
the idea of universal adult suMrage.255 
However, the notion of reciprocity between citizenship rights and obliga-
tions in Australia gives rise to a number of uncertainties. First, identifying 
either rights or obligations that are unique to Australian citizens is challeng-
ing. is is underlined by the sheer paucity of either judicial commentary  
or scholarly consideration of the obligations of Australian citizenship.  
e thinness of material to draw upon makes the analysis in this Part neces-
sarily brief. 
Commonwealth statutes that discriminate on the basis of community 
membership do not consistently make rights contingent upon citizenship; 
instead, they also base rights upon the lower threshold of residence.256 
Further, as Part III of this article demonstrates, even in the areas in which 
possession of Australian citizenship makes a signiIcant practical diMerence to 
the treatment a person receives, this is oAen achieved in the absence of any 
express codiIcation of citizenship rights. Where rights are both codiIed and 
strongly linked with citizenship, as with voting rights, non-citizens are 
 
 253 Roach (2007) 233 CLR 162, 177 [12]. 
 254 Ibid 176 [11]–[12]. 
 255 Ibid 177 [12]. 
 256 See Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law in Context, above n 9, 184. 
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nonetheless not excluded in their entirety, and rights are, in some cases, 
denied to citizens even when no obligations have been breached.257  
Ascertaining obligations that are unique to citizens is similarly diUcult. 
e Department of Immigration and Border Protection webpage states that 
the responsibilities of citizenship are to ‘obey the law’, ‘defend Australia 
should the need arise’, ‘vote in federal and state or territory elections, and in 
[referenda]’ and ‘serve on a jury if called to do so’.258 However, the Irst three 
of these obligations are not uniquely held by citizens. All persons within 
Australia are bound to obey Australian law, and a lack of citizenship (or even 
of permanent residency) does not protect a person against being conscripted 
into defending the nation ‘should the need arise.’ In a time of war, any person 
between the ages of 18 and 60 years who has resided in Australia for six 
months or more can be called upon by proclamation of the Governor-General 
to serve in the Defence Force for the duration of the war.259 Further, as 
mentioned in Part III(E), some British subjects retain exercisable voting rights 
in Australia.260 It is diUcult to conceive of rights and obligations as truly 
reciprocal where the obligations are imposed in the absence of guaranteed 
rights, and where fulIlment of obligations does not in practice give rise to 
corresponding rights in all cases.261 
Secondly, the legal position of all Australian citizens is not equal. Some 
Australians are more susceptible to losing their citizenship,262 or to exclusion 
from the country,263 than others. is raises the question of whether any 
‘obligations’ that arise reciprocally to these rights are more onerous for these 
 
 257 An example of this is the denial of voting rights to citizens who intend to reside overseas for 
in excess of six years: Commonwealth Electoral Act ss 94–94A. 
 258 Department of Immigration and Border Protection, above n 64. 
 259 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) ss 59–60. e constitutionality of requiring resident aliens to perform 
military service was challenged, and upheld, in the 1945 case of Polites v Commonwealth 
(1945) 70 CLR 60. 
 260 Commonwealth Electoral Act s 93(1)(b)(ii). 
 261 Along similar lines, Irving has noted that making legal citizenship rights contingent upon the 
performance of legal duties incumbent upon all persons regardless of citizenship status may 
generate a system in which citizens are more onerously penalised than non-citizens for 
breaching such duties. While non-citizens would only suMer the penalty for failing to per-
form the duty, citizens would be subject both to this penalty as well as the loss of whatever 
citizenship rights are reciprocally linked to the duty: see Helen Irving, ‘Rights and Citizen-
ship in Law and Public Discourse’ in Tom Campbell, JeMrey Goldsworthy and Adrienne 
Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in 
Australia (Ashgate, 2006) 161, 170. 
 262 See part III(B)(5) above. 
 263 See part III(C)(2) above. 
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more vulnerable citizens than for other Australians. In a similar vein, the 
formal undertakings of all citizens are not equal. People who obtain citizen-
ship by conferral are required to pledge loyalty to Australia and its people, to 
express commitment to Australia’s democratic beliefs and respect for its rights 
and liberties, and to promise to ‘uphold and obey’ its laws, via the Pledge of 
Commitment. ose who gain citizenship automatically at birth or by 
descent, however, are not required to make any such undertakings. is raises 
the question of whether the Pledge itself could amount to a source of citizen-
ship obligations and, if so, whether these obligations operate diMerently upon 
diMerent classes of citizen. e language of the Preamble also points to the 
possibility that citizenship obligations may vary depending on how a person 
obtained citizenship. AAer describing Australian citizenship as ‘a common 
bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations’, the Preamble states that: 
  e Parliament recognises that persons conferred Australian citizenship enjoy 
these rights and undertake to accept these obligations: 
 (a) by pledging loyalty to Australia and its people; and 
 (b) by sharing their democratic beliefs; and 
 (c) by respecting their rights and liberties; and 
 (d) by upholding and obeying the laws of Australia.264  
ese four undertakings correspond to the undertakings in the Pledge of 
Commitment. e Preamble’s reference to persons ‘conferred’ Australian 
citizenship arguably supports the view that these commitments only apply to 
persons who have obtained citizenship by conferral, and do not extend to 
those who hold citizenship by birth or descent. is, however, seems at odds 
with the idea, also expressed in the Preamble, that Australian citizenship is a 
‘common bond’ that ‘unites all Australians’. 
V  CONCLUSION  
In the introduction to this article, I suggested that the Preamble to the ACA 
2007 makes three claims about the nature of Australian statutory citizenship: 
that holding citizenship grants a person a ‘full and formal membership of the 
Australian community’ that non-citizens do not hold; that such membership 
is characterised by the possession of ‘reciprocal rights and obligations’; and 
that citizenship is a bond that unites those who hold it, suggesting that it is 
underpinned by principles of equality. 
 
 264 Emphasis added. 
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Gleeson CJ’s comments in Roach suggest that the Preamble’s claims are not 
entirely normative: to at least some degree they indicate legal implications that 
Low from Australian citizenship. Parts III and IV of this article tested the 
extent to which the Preamble’s claims are reLected in the legal rights and 
duties of Australian citizens in four key domains that have long been regarded 
as deeply connected with citizenship. 
e analysis in these Parts gives rise to mixed conclusions. While, as Ru-
benstein has established, most rights in Australia are not made contingent 
upon citizenship, in each of the categories examined in this article, the rights 
of citizens are materially diMerent from those of non-citizens. In three of the 
four categories — status protection rights, rights to entry and abode, and 
political rights — this distinction is legal in nature.265 Arguably, this lends 
some credence to the claim that citizenship is an essential element of ‘full and 
formal’ community membership. 
e claim that statutory citizenship is characterised by ‘reciprocal rights 
and obligations’ is more contestable. Part III demonstrates that where a 
person’s legal position is aMected by their citizenship status, this is not always 
achieved through the express codiIcation of citizenship rights. In the case of 
entry and abode rights, for instance, the privilege of Australian citizens stems 
instead from the express denial of certain rights to non-citizens.266 e lack of 
expressly recognised, guaranteed citizens’ rights makes the argument that 
such rights arise in exchange for the fulIlment of citizenship obligations a 
tenuous one. Moreover, many of the obligations conceived of as ‘citizenship 
responsibilities’ apply equally to some non-citizens, who do not become 
entitled to the rights of citizenship in exchange for performance.267 is, 
again, suggests that any rights and obligations held by citizens are not, in fact, 
reciprocal in nature. 
Finally, the idea that Australian citizens are united by legal equality is du-
bious. e ACA 2007 establishes diMerent classes of citizenship, some of which 
are better protected against revocation than others. e fact that only certain 
classes of citizens are obliged to take the Pledge of Commitment raises 
 
 265 In the case of rights to protection, Australian citizens do appear to enjoy greater rights to 
diplomatic assistance than non-citizens. However, as no rights in this area are codiIed, this 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens cannot be classiIed as a legal one, and the 
degree of distinction is diUcult to measure. 
 266 is is at odds with the legal framework in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, 
all of which confer express rights to enter and reside in their respective territories upon their 
citizens. 
 267 See Part IV above. 
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questions about whether diMerent citizens have diMerent legal obligations. 
Moreover, statutory citizenship must be situated within the parameters of a 
constitutional framework which does not necessarily conceive of all citizens 
equally: there is a danger, for instance, that certain citizens might fall within 
the ambit of the expansive immigration and aliens powers. ese factors 
suggest that the image painted by the Preamble, of Australian citizenship as a 
gateway to full and equal community membership, may well be illusory, at 
least in legal terms. 
 
